Proliferation Press

2007-01-08T08:22:00.000-08:00

Proliferation Press Has Moved!

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Check out the revamped website!

Thank you for visiting and we hope you enjoy the new site!

-Proliferation Press

2006-11-30T08:56:00.000-08:00

Perkovich Blows Up the "Democratic Bomb" Doesn't Help Much on Fallout

George Perkovich, a Carnegie Endowment senior fellow, blasts the Bush White House's handling of WMD proliferation, urging the United States to adopt the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and work towards making nuclear proliferation a recognized international crime. But the policy brief fails to compelling links these proposals to solving the nuclear dilemmas of Iran and North Korea.

Opponents of the dismal Bush foreign policy record must begin to link their overall proliferation strategies with clear steps to alleviating today's nuclear stand-offs.

If not progressives risk losing on foreign policy in '08, regardless of who wins the White House.

The report follows a mid-term election that has been seen as a rebuff to President Bush and his foreign policy of democratic regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another aspect of this foreign policy has been the administration's push to stem worrisome nuclear proliferation by focusing on certain states. The Bush administration has harshly criticized Iran and North Korea for developing their nuclear capabilities, while also leading a charge to modernize the U.S. nuclear forces and pursue a nuclear deal with India.

Perkovich calls the approach "risky," citing that "Iran and North Korea and perhaps others may see nuclear weapons as the best bulwark against U.S. intervention."

Perkovich makes the case for universal rules to manage the numerous aspects WMD proliferation. Such a strategy demands that America engage and come to accommodation with its strategic rivals, instead of pushing for regime-change.

His most potent arguments against selectively rewarding "good" states and "punishing" bad states, are also the most well-known: a) most states are "gray"--neither completely good nor bad-- and b) states change.

The unilateral, regime-centric approach undermines cooperation between the nuclear powers, according to Perkovich. Alienating or provoking Russia and China with nuclear deals to India or encouraging Japanese re-militarization breaks the ability of the world's great nuclear powers to work together to tackle worrisome proliferation--whether through sanctions or other diplomatic strategies.

The report offers little new, but does digestibly present the complicated issue of WMD proliferation. Only the charge to make nuclear proliferation an officially recognized international crime succeeds in spinning a new yarn on an old theme.

Yet the report fails to show how universal rules for proliferation get us to solve the nonproliferation regime's two great challenges: North Korea and Iran.

And when it comes to picking policy makers, it will be those two pressing issues--not the wonkish issue of universal guidelines or selective strategy--that will define the '08 elections and the next White House's foreign policy.

2006-11-29T12:50:00.000-08:00

Bush-Malaki Meeting Postponed

Talks between Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki have turned into a diplomatic nightmare for President Bush, showing the world just a stressed U.S.-Iraq relationship.
Bush did not cancel the meeting with al-Maliki, but postponed it until Thrusday. I guess this was to buy time while a final decision is made on whether or not to meet is made.
WaPo reports:

President Bush’s planned meeting Wednesday in Jordan with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was put off following the public disclosure of U.S. concerns about the Iraqi leader’s ability to control the raging sectarian violence in his country.

This last minute change seems to show just how little the Bush administration understands about Iraq political situation. A major Shiite partner in the governing coaltion, allied with Moqtada al-Sadr, had commenced a boycott of their government roles.

Or perhaps it just reflects the leaked White House memo gives an unflattering description of al-Maliki’s performance. As reported by the New York Times:

“His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change,” the memo said of the Iraqi leader. “But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.”

The postponement seems to only show how weak the American position in Iraq is, and settles nothing for al-Maliki on his domestic front.

2006-11-29T11:54:00.000-08:00

Iraq's Unity Government-- Fraying or Surging?

The blogosphere and general media is abuzz with news of a boycott by a powerful Shiite group—led by Moqtada al-Sadr—in

Iraq

's governing coalition. And yesterday Iraq’s President Jalal Talibani went to Iran to meet with

Iran

’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad .

Alex, over at Martini Republic, writes:

"An already weak and ineffective Iraqi government led by Nouri al Maliki loses the backing of a powerful faction of lawmakers..."

Yet he fails to mention an important aspect of the boycott, found in WaPo's coverage:

But Rubaie cautioned that their action did not mean the officials were pulling out of the government [emphasis added], which would all but guarantee the collapse of Iraq's unity government.

"The suspension does not mean our withdrawal from the political process," said Rubaie. He added the Sadr bloc would meet in coming days to discuss how long members would remain out of the government.

To hit up Bush for meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is a tad unfair. I doubt Bush pushed this meeting because he thinks such an action "imbues them [Iraqi officials] with domestic legitimacy."

In fact, I think he made the right calculation: knowing that Sadr wouldn't risk being blamed for worsening Iraq’s already dire civil crisis. And maybe such independence by Prime Minister al-Maliki, dovetailed with what appears a very successful visit to Iran by Iraq's President, is the right diplomatic path for the embattled Iraqi regime to take.

This observation shouldn't be mistaken for a blanket endorsement of the Iraqi regime or Bush's Iraq policy. But it does point to a regrettable truth: something positive has to happen in Iraq to improve the situation. And just maybe this boycott is necessary if there be any hope for a stable national Iraqi government of any type or strength-- seemingly the only way to avoid a Yugoslavia-like breakdown.

North Korea Hot for Nuclear Talks and Asian Games, Not Human Rights

2006-11-28T09:44:00.000-08:00

Six-Party Talks Back On!

WaPo's Benjamin Kang Lim reports on North Korea's return to the negotiating table-- in the form of six-party talks.

Lim shows sheds light on yesterday's diplomatic shuffle in Beijing. North Korean official Kim Kye-gwan met with the chief North Korean diplomat Christopher Hill, South Korea's
nuclear envoy Chun Yung-woo, Japan's envoy Kenichiro Sasae, and China's Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei.

The U.S. has refused to entertain North Korean calls for bilateral talks between the two nations,
favoring instead the six party framework that brings together North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

North Korea's recent testing of a nuclear weapon provoked harsh reactions from the international community, including China, and saw intensified pressure for North Korea's return to the six-party talks.

But while Lim caved to these demands yesterday, he made sure to employ two face-saving measures--one hard, one soft.

China Daily showcases a sympathetic portrayal of the North Korea position—big shock! In it we see it was always North Korea's intent to return to six-party talks, but only after it could do so from a "dignified position":

Kim said the timing "depends on the United States."

"There are too many outstanding issues" and both parties should narrow their differences, Kim told reporters on arrival at the airport.

"I said on October 31 that we can enter the talks at any time," he
said. "I said that because we can do that from a dignified position as we
have taken defensive measures through our nuclear test to counter sanctions and
pressure against us."

This flurry of activity comes near ASEAN (a group of ten South East Nations that includes

Singapore

Thailand

Vietnam

Indonesia

and the

Philippines

) putting its diplomatic weight behind returning

North Korea

to the negotiating table.

Asian Games

This diplomatic thawing comes on the heels of the Asian Games, an-all Asian nation Olympics.
The games open this Friday in Doha, Qatar.

The sporting competition is hoped to warm chilled relations between the two
Korean nations.

From the International Herald Tribune:

Yonhap, the South Korean news agency, said it would be the eighth time the Koreas have marched together at an international sports event.
The two countries will not be competing together, however.
South Korea's 830-member delegation, most of which was to arrive on Wednesday, is hoping to win 70-75 golds, while the North is setting its sights on a much more humble goal of about 10 gold medals. The North is expected to participate in 16 events.

Kim Jang San, the North Korean delegation chief, said the North is hoping to win medals in boxing
and the Korean martial art of taekwondo.

Perhaps this good-will diplomacy will push some good-will into the contentious six party talks.

U.N. Flags DPRK’s Human Rights Record

This diplomatic activity also comes after an embarrassing United Nations
resolution on North Korea's poor human rights record. Amnesty
International reports:

On 17 November, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted its second resolution condemning North Korea's record on human rights with a vote of 91 in favour of the resolution, 21 against and 60 abstentions. The resolution contains tougher language than the earlier resolution adopted in November 2005. It also requests the UN Secretary General (the SG designate is Ban Ki-moon, former South Korean Foreign Minister) to submit a comprehensive report on the human rights situation in North Korea.

The press release brings attention to North Korea's continuing food crisis, rampant child malnutrition, executions of political opponents, use of torture, and restrictions of free speech.

2006-11-27T14:46:00.000-08:00

News Update and Opinion: Low Approval Ratings Undermine Olmert's Plea for Peace

(Updated version of a previous CampusProgress.org posting)

News Update

Today's NYTimes leads with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's plea for peace between Israel and the Palestinian territories.

The NYTimes does not dwell on Olmert's low popularity within Israel or his Kadima party's dwindling support. As the reported by the International Herald Tribune, a recent poll put Olmert's approval rating at an anemic 20 percent.

And Reuters reported three days ago on a recent newspaper poll putting the Kadima party Olmert's leads behind Benjamin Netanyahu's more hard-line Likud party.

Olmert's unpopularity has come in large part from the botched Israeli military incursion into Lebanon he green lighted earlier this year. (Link to Olmert's political history and role in the Lebanon invasion)

Perhaps Olmert is giving peace a chance to have gain a chance at the polls.

But even if this cynical reading of Olmert's proposal is unfounded (and it probably is), the question remains: is Olmert is any position to conclude a high-stakes peace agreement with Palestine?

Opinion

Olmert may just become one of the most tragic leaders of current Israeli history.

Never meant to be Prime Minister (that was supposed to be the still-comatose Ariel Sharron), Olmert headed up the Lebanon invasion to both improve Israeli security and increase his standing on military matters.

The plan: repeal the threat of missiles on Israel, and then take that hawkish capital to make peace in Israel. A reasonable but risky plan.

Had Sharon been able to lead Kadima, this appearance concern would have not existed.

But the plan didn't turn out: the invasion failed. Now Olmert is trying to forge support for the Kadima party by suing for peace, from an extremely weakened position.

Perhaps the voters who rallied to support Sharon last summer will see that it's time for a real peace process and that Netanyahu does not offer a better course. But it seems likely that Netanyahu will succeed in making this last-ditch attempt for political survival look just like that-- and not a principled or workable plan towards peace.

2006-11-24T19:53:00.000-08:00

Proliferation Press News Roundup

"Did I Skip Over Pakistan?"
China & the U.S. India Deal According to Prakash Ambegaonkar: Trade Relations = Strategic Balancing

A good article by Dr. Prakash Ambegaonkar on the India-US nuclear deal. It delves into how the deal may affect trade calculus between these three countries; therefore it sheds light on what might be the real aim of the deal (winning over India on trade, and pushing China to do the same).

Thus it helps flesh out what is meant by U.S. advocates when they say the deal will make India an American partner in the region.

But the article left me after the first read going, "Okay...did I skip over the discussion on Pakistan?" So I re-read, and found that indeed there was not one mention of this country-- nixing much of the value of a still very useful approach to understanding the full contours U.S.-India nuclear deal.

The article's main warrant: India still plays the role neutral (or unaligned) power-- looking to take a little from all ends. It's other--more controversial warrant: All these three countries are fundamentally looking to find a mutually satisfying way to improve relations with one another.

The first warrant is on the money, highlighting something many supporters of the deal refuse to acknowledge: The deal doesn't buy Indian loyalty or fundamentally change their foreign policy. Hopes to turn India into a China-balancer/U.S. partner on par with Japan are just fantasy.

On the second warrant, while all these countries do want peaceful and profitable relations, the article forgets they each want it on their own set of terms.

But by moving beyond the zero-sum view on diplomacy so rampant in other accounts, the article reflects one of the better descriptions of the Indian diplomatic perspective. But its focus on trade undervalues the strategic rationale that propelled the deal from America's end.

Glaring omission: not one mention of Pakistan or the evolving Sino-Pakistani relationship.

(Note: such add-on criticisms are the softest of all, since no article can be exhaustive. But when ones throws China into the U.S.-India deal discussion, it's hard to forgive not giving Pakistan a seat as well at the ongoing diplomatic poker game between China, America and India.)

Leaving out Pakistan makes the "soft power" paradigm the article rests on appear to hold greater explanatory power than it actually does. The omission removes the need to refute clear cases of China balancing an ascendant India by lending Pakistan support. (Note: Pakistan doesn't mind taking from both ends; it enjoys significant American support-- lest it become a terrorist hotbed).

Pakistan is the most significant (and volatile) variable in the diplomatic equation. With it's weak regime, significant extremist support, nuclear armaments, and history of internal terrorism, Pakistan is the one powder-keg no one wants to-- but needs to-- imagine going off.

2006-11-21T13:38:00.000-08:00

Getting Different Views on Iraq: Hudson Institute Chimes In

The Hudson Institute hosted an event today on the future of Iraq.

Subject of particular interest: the panelists view of the Iraq Study Group (ISG).

You my coverage of the event at Campus Progress.

Highlight: You get to watch atendees Hillel Fradkin, Hudson Senior fellow and ISG member, and Peter Prost, former CIA terrorism official, fight over Vietnam and (by analogy) America's mission in Iraq.

2006-11-20T15:43:00.000-08:00

China Voices Concern Over U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, Then Offers Its Own?

The Hindu reports today reports that China will take a "responsible attitude" towards the U.S.-India nuclear deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG).

In normal-speak that means, "We're not thrilled, but we're not vetoing it-- especially if you give us something too!"

So what would China want from India, in order to allay fears the U.S.-India nuclear deal represents a pro-U.S., anti-Chinese tilt on the part of India? (Remember Bush considers China a "strategic rival" in the region, and Congressmen of all stripes lauded such a development when approving the deal).

Why not a China-India nuclear deal?

That's what the Boston Globe reports:

China and India are poised to sign a civilian nuclear cooperation deal during President Hu Jintao's four-day state visit to the South Asian giant that begins today, Indian officials said yesterday, similar to the recent agreement between the United States and India.
Article Tools
The deal would foster the exchange and purchase of nuclear technology between the two emerging Asian powers, and is expected to be announced in a joint statement at the end of Hu's visit on Thursday, according to two officials familiar with the impending accord who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Now this comes as Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a visit to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi, as reported by Reuters' Simon Denyer.

Now as Denyer goes on to report, the two leaders plan no "spectacular agreements" and the two can't even get trade under control.

(Here are highlights for the visit:

Free trade "not on the cards", NDTVProfit.com
Hotline between their foreign ministries India-Asian News Service
India has a significant population of Tibetans, who will be watching the talks closely, Human Rights Watch)

In fact, Denyer goes so far to say that "Chinese analysts [that nebulous term] say that Hu, who will visit Islamabad after India, may announce China's own nuclear cooperation deal with Pakistan as a counterbalance to the U.S.-India deal."

Such was the diplomatic rejoinder many expected, especially after the Senate passed the India nuclear deal last Thursday night.

What's going on?

My guess would be Indian officials pushing highly speculative predictions, in order to accomplish two things:

1) Look to China as less of a strategic threat
2) Shows its independence from the U.S. right after the final legislative hurdled was passed in the Congress

If this deal actually materialized before the final resolution is passed by the Senate and the House, the India-US deal might just be derailed.

But even the worry of such a deal will surely gives those vociferous, American proponents of the U.S.-India nuclear deal a much-needed dose of reality. Lavishing a country with nuclear fuel and technology won't "buy" America an ally.

In the meantime, the big thing to notice is China's downplaying of its past criticism.

It suggests that one big road block to the U.S.-India-- Chinese opposition at the NSG--deal has been averted.

But at what price?

2006-11-08T11:01:00.000-08:00

Bush on India Deal: “I’m trying to get the

India

deal done...”

Today President Bush touched on the U.S.-India nuclear deal in his announcement of Rumfeld's resignation. And his words might just represent the death of this controversial piece of foreign policy.

But this is no quiet ending. These words suggest a last-ditch attempt by the White House to push the U.S.-India nuclear deal through a lame duck session of the Senate.

Will Lugar, Republican chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, lead this bill to the floor? Will Democrats defeat a bill many individual members support to circumscribe Bush's handling of foreign affairs?

Or will Democrats, if Webb wins his VA seat, pass the U.S.-India nuclear deal as bi-partisan gesture while putting the coals on Bush for Iraq?

If Democrats take the Senate,

Bush's plan seeked pre-approval for Congress on the nuclear deal before the Nuclear Suppliers Group and IAEA approve the deal, where they would likely add stipulations.

And while Bush today put the India deal first in his foreign priorities, his Administration has already pushed for a Vietnam trade bill to be considered first by the lame duck session.

Joe Biden offered a detailed position on the U.S. India deal in April 2006:

Congress should not give up its powers under existing law without knowing what a U.S.-India peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement and India’s safeguards agreements with the IAEA will contain.

Let’s be clear: the India nuclear deal could go forward without changing the law.
A peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India would simply require approval by joint resolution – a majority in each house of Congress.

But the Administration seeks a special exemption from the law, to allow the agreement to proceed unless Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval, which would require a two-thirds vote in each house to override a presidential veto.

Why does the President want to change the law? Does he doubt that he could get a
majority to approve the agreement? If so, why?

But the fact remains, the India nuclear deal will most likely pass. The only difference between this vote and the house vote will be characters: with Sen. Boxer and Sen. Feingold playing the role of Markey in the House.

2006-11-07T09:44:00.000-08:00

Proliferation Update: North Korea

“…North Korea will not be recognized as nuclear-weapon state,”

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao on the U.S.-supported Resolution 1718. The resolution calls on nations to stop any North Korean exporting of nuclear technology.

“Japan, meanwhile, drew up a list of 20 luxury goods to be banned from export to North Korea in line with the U.N. sanctions,” Kyodo News reports today. But the “prospects of implementing the sanctions…appear[s] uncertain in light of reluctance by China and South Korea to push for sanctions now…”

“North Korea is now responding to the international community's resolve,”

Secretary of State Rice told Fox News on Monday.

“Resolution 1718 by the Security Council is the consensus of the international community, and all countries have the obligation to strictly, earnestly, and responsibly implement the Resolution. China is no exception. On the other hand, China hold that no party should expand or interpret Resolution 1718 at will, rather, all parties should take relevant measures strictly in line with the Resolution.”

U.S.-South Korea Joint Statement released after US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns met with South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Myung Hwan.

Highlights US-position that NK should not receive more bargaining leverage in upcoming disarmament talks because of its recent test.

2006-11-06T12:31:00.000-08:00

Russia and India Begin Space Cooperation

Russian today signed into law a pact with India to share space technology for peaceful uses.

Daily News Analysis, an Indian paper, reports on the recently concluded pact here:

The framework agreement signed in New Delhi during Putin's visit in December 2004 sets a streamlined system and identifies the mechanism for enhanced cooperation in peaceful exploration of space, including protection of secret information and intellectual property rights and settling disputes.

After signing into law by president Putin, Indo-Russian space cooperation will acquire strategic character and would speed up joint collaboration in completing and operationalising the Global Navigational Satellite System (GLONASS) to end the monopoly of the Pentagon controlled US Global Positioning System (GPS), sources in the Russian Federal Space Agency Roskosmos said.

Russian News & Information Agency offers more details on the future GPS competitor:

Russia and India will use a 24-satellite navigational and global positioning system, Glonass, together, a spokesman for the Russian Federal Space Agency said.

"A Russian inter-departmental delegation will arrive in India to coordinate the details October 27," Igor Panarin said.

Glonass, a Russian analogue of the United States Global Positioning System, is designed to allow both military and civilian users around the globe to receive signals from satellites to identify their positions in real time. It can also be used in geological prospecting.

They point to the strategically competitive nature of the venture:

Russia is expected to supply seven cryogenic upper stages to India, which originally wanted to buy the Russian technology to build the engines domestically, but U.S. pressure prevented their delivery. India has been working to develop a cryogenic engine for the past 11 years.

Working to cut its dependence on foreign launch vehicles, India has had four operational GSLV flights since 2004 using Russian engines for the upper stage.

The story, along with the many India-US nuclear deal posts, shows the stakes of technology diplomacy. Major powers, be they Japan, China, Russia or America are all scrambling to make deeper inroads with rising powers.

Now how this technological diplomacy may affect proliferation concerns—whether space, nuclear, chemical, or biological—has yet to be determined.

But one thing is for sure-- the international community as a whole is not doing a good job formulating standardized rules for technology sharing. And is do doing bilatteral aggrements-- differing standards, poor verification, potenial secret agreements-- all come to the fore.

2006-11-05T22:58:00.000-08:00

IAEA Cites Six Nuclear Power Aspriants in Middle East and North Africa

The Australian reports on a recent IAEA report that shows six Middle Eastern and North African nations prusuing nuclear power.

Read the article here.

2006-11-05T07:20:00.000-08:00

Japanese Leaders Clash Over Nukes

In Japan, even having a discussion over the nation's nuclear status has split Japan's governing national party, the LDP. The leading players in the drama? LDP senior party members Shoichi Nakagawa (left), a nuclear advocate, and Toshihiro Nikai (right), a strong opponent of evening discussing the issue.

This debate is vitally important to understanding today's non-proliferation issues. Japan, as the only nation to suffer a nuclear attack, is an essential piece of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Whereas many would point to the India-US nuclear deal, Iran's nuclear posturing, or North Korea's nuclear defiance as the crucial test of non-proliferation, Japan's nuclear status is an under-reported and no less important proliferation issue.

The Scotsman offers a Reuters report. The report displays well the weight of the Japanese nuclear dilemma, as it is the sole nation to suffer a nuclear strike:

Japan watched nervously as North Korea fired off a series of ballistic missiles in July and tested a nuclear device last month.

As the only country to have suffered nuclear attacks, on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Japan is highly sensitive about nuclear issues and even suggestions the country hold a debate about having nuclear weapons has created a controversy.

For more detail into the political split within Japan's ruling party, this AP report (courtesy of the International Tribune) is the place to go:

Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly insisted his party won't stray from its long-standing non-nuclear principles, but hasn't been able to bring hawks like Nakagawa and Foreign Minister Taro Aso in line with party policy. That has raised doubts, among some, of Abe's ability to keep his lieutenants in check.

"Abe's Cabinet is obviously divided on this issue," lawmaker Yoshiaki Takaki of the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan told NHK. "These are grave remarks and cannot be overlooked."

The Chinese newspaper Xinhua offers insight into the political calculus of Japanese opposition parties: Reporting on their recent call that Japanese Foreign Minister resign-- owing to his support of a pro-nuclear advocate within his party.

Clearly the nuclear issue is a hot-button issue within Japan-- dividing the ruling party and stirring fierce debate nationally. This is good news for proliferation doves who fear an further erosion of the non-proliferation norm. Yet realists may point out that it is only a matter of time before Japan's embraces its nuclear capability.

Unfortunately the effects of such a decision would undermine any international cooperation on Iran, and would most likely spur a new arms race in Asia between China and Japan.

2006-11-01T08:27:00.000-08:00

Happy Birthday Hydrogen Bomb!!!
A Short Note on Today's Earthshaking Anniversary

Today marks the fifty-fourth anniversary of the thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb. While it wasn't deployable until 1954, the U.S. exploded the first hydrogen bomb in 1952 at Enewetak in the U.S. Marshall Islands.

It is hard to believe that these weapons dwarf their atomic counterparts that devastated Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

A typical fission-based atomic bomb packs a punch of 500,000 tons of TNT. But a Soviet hydrogen bomb test pushed this yield through the roof: reaching 50 million tons of TNT.

So roughly, 1 hydrogen bomb = 100 atomic bombs

Numbers like that can sure blow you away!

And what about the number of countries with these weapons?

So far the number stands at six or seven: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China and (maybe) India and Israel.

PBS.org offers an extremely well-designed and informative web-site on the U.S.-Soviet Hydrogen bomb race.

From the Cold War to today's North Korean and Iranian crises, one finds the hydrogen bomb one of those gifts that just keeps on giving.

So Happy Birthday Hydrogen Bomb! Sorry if I don't make the party--I know it has been on hold for a while now.

2006-10-31T12:28:00.000-08:00

11-5 Update: The Other Proliferation Press: Morocco Meeting of Evolving Nuclear Terrorism Initiative Wraps Up

While North Korea's return to six-party talks dominates today's proliferation press, another important development in America's counter-proliferation strategy is wrapping up today.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a US-Russian led program launched in 2005, is finishing a two-day summit in Rabat, Morocco.

Morocco officially joined the 12 other members of the soon-to-be enacted program, becoming the first predominantly Arab nation to join the GICNT.

The Washington Post reports on the event:

Joseph [U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control] also said that participant states should work together to deny terrorists access to nuclear or radioactive materials, prevent nuclear terrorism, and respond in case of a nuclear attack by terrorists.

After this meeting, he said, we would expand the number of countries willing to endorse the initiative's principles and carry out necessary preventative measures and proactive actions, including enacting or changing relevant laws to prosecute nuclear terrorists.

Joseph also said that the project would be modeled on the three-year-old Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that began with a small group of partners and now is backed by 80 countries who want to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

PSI and GICNT represent the Bush administration's attempts to address the problems nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

Instead of working on the international level, starting at the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), PSI and GICNT represent a hegemonic approach to arms-control: with the US and Russia unveiling programs and then pushing for greater membership.

Such an approach limits dissent (from countries like India, Pakistan, Israel or Iran), but can prove difficult to administer without board international support.

As such PSI has a mixed record: rapidly gaining members, but still having to define its enforcement authority.

PINR analyst Dr. Harsh V. Pant contended his in piece, ''The Demise of the Global Arms Control Regime'', that arms-control agreements work best when seen as mutually beneficial-- not attempts by major states to hem in other states.

Pant writes,

For long, major powers have deftly used various arms control provisions to constrain the strategic autonomy of other states in the international system. India's nuclear tests were the first direct challenge to the great powers and the result has been a complete overhaul of the international security environment. The demise of the international arms control regime is a small part of that overhaul.

India has always been dissatisfied with the global non-proliferation and arms control regime because it constrained its autonomy to make foreign policy decisions as dictated by national interests. It argued that an inequitable regime that gave only a few countries the permanent right to nuclear weapons and denied others this right was inherently unstable. It is this fundamental instability that has come to haunt the global nuclear order today.

A new global security architecture is needed if there is to be an attempt to tackle the emerging problem of proliferation and terrorism since the old security structure has largely failed.

PSI and GICNT show great importance of quiet diplomacy in securing international security. While the Bush administration's regime-change approach may cause headaches for years to come, ensuring these programs are capable and effective by the administration's end would be a valiant and much-needed service to the American public.

The challenge for the Bush administration will be to make these programs durable, able to bring short-term and long-term protections from the proliferation or nuclear materials and weapons.

[Update]

Middle East News Online, Canada

"This is designed to build a partnership of countries that are committed to countering nuclear terrorism." U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph said. "We do know that nonstate actors -- terrorists -- are very interested in acquiring this type of capability and would not hesitate to use it."

The meeting stemmed from a G8 summit in July 2006 that established a framework to prevent nuclear insurgency strikes. Officials said the summit in Rabat discussed security improvements at civilian nuclear facilities, investigations of suspected nuclear smuggling and enhancement of accounting procedures for nuclear and radioactive substances.

Other Links of Note:

“13 Nations Meet on Nuclear Containment.” John Throne, Associated Press.

State Department Press Release. October 26th, 2006.

“Persian Gulf exercise, Morocco meeting advance U.S.-initiated anti-proliferation project.” Herald International Tribune, Associated Press.

Biography: Robert Joseph, Under Secretary on Arms Control. Right Web. (Views presented are not endorsed by Proliferation Press)

“S. Korea's fear of clash with North is absurd.” The Jerusalem Post. Associated Press.

2006-10-23T15:29:00.000-07:00

“WWII Is Over”; And So Should U.S. Hopes for Japanese Nukes: Responding to the Latest Neo-Con Insight of Charles Krauthammer

Charles Krauthammer, the consummate neo-con pundit provocateur, writes a beautifully crafted, but logically murky Friday op-ed in last week’s Washington Post.

The argument? A little foggy.

But one thing’s clear: Krauthammer’s murky call for Japanese high-stakes, quasi nuclear-brinkmanship against China not only stands as one of his less articulate op-eds, but perhaps his most dangerous.

But, first: What is Krauthammer saying? I offer two possibilities:

Option A: Japan Should Go Nuclear

“The American reaction to such talk is knee-jerk opposition. Like those imperial Japanese soldiers discovered holed up on some godforsaken Pacific island decades after World War II, we continue to act as if we, too, never received news of the Japanese surrender. We applaud the Japanese for continuing their adherence to the MacArthur constitution that forever denies Japan the status of Great Power replete with commensurate military force.”

Option B: A Japanese Threat of Nuclear Weaponization Would Compel China to Put the Pressure on North Korea

“Japan's threatening to go nuclear would alter that calculation. It might even persuade China to squeeze Kim Jong Il as a way to prevent Japan from going nuclear. The Japan card remains the only one that carries even the remote possibility of reversing North Korea's nuclear program.”

Krauthammer rarely dishes up such muddled reasoning. But, putting on my best George Bailey impersonation, I licensed Krauthammer the following hybrid thesis:

Japan has every right to go nuclear; and if Japan threatened such an action, China would be spurred into better containing North Korea’s nuclear threat—which would then eliminate the actual need of Japanese nuclear weaponization (not that there’s anything wrong with that).

Whoa—Krauthammer. What’s up with the 2004 Kerry-esque incoherence?

Just call it what it is: a nuclear-charged, diplomatic gambit.

Oh, because then everyone reading it would rapidly turn the page.

Would China’s reaction be that restrained? And is a Japanese threat of nuclear weapons really so inconsequential to other world players?

So, with this in mind, let’s consider the risks a Krauthammer’s Nuclear Japan Strategy may pose.

Risk #1: China, fearing further US-Japanese aggression, seeks to modernize its nuclear deterrent and embraces North Korea as its most reliable (if annoying) friend in the region.

Risk #2: Japan threatening to build nuclear weapons would really kill the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Note #1: Krauthammer evokes the “fact” that all great powers have gone nuclear decades ago. Here he forgets about Germany.

Japan and Germany are critical to maintaining the NPT: A document that seeks to, however imperfectly, 1) limit the desire of states for nuclear weapons and 2) build international support for counter-proliferation.

Risk #3: America, again, looks like a hypocrite. Except this time it looses any international support for its counter-proliferation stance towards Iran.

Note #2: America continuously argues that Iran and North Korea, by virtue of their signatures of the NPT, must continue to renounce nuclear weapons. Yet, if America encourages (a loyal ally) Japan to junk the treaty, how can America have any authority to tell other nations they do not have the right to go nuclear.

And don’t forget, the U.S. already was pushing its luck with the India nuclear deal.

Krauthammer would no doubt evoke the need for “case by case”, not “rule-based” nuclear diplomacy. And, in doing so, would point to Japan’s stable, status-quo, democratic government as earning it the right to go nuclear. But any bright lines distinctions would be turned to mush the next day.

Why?

Because, as Krauthammer concedes, this is about American interests first and foremost—not the concerns of counter-proliferation or diplomatic consistency.

If Krauthammer can see this, I think the rest of the international community can as well.

But such concerns are those of weak-kneed, appeasing, and amoral internationalists.

Unfortunately these concerns come with hard-elbowed, firm, and moral consequences. But, in Krauthammer’s defense, neo-cons have come to admit their weakness at consequence comprehension.

2006-10-18T08:12:00.000-07:00

Proliferation Press News-Round Up: Japan to go Nuclear?

Will Japan go nuclear? Today most news-wires say no. But what does this mean? And how is Japan responding to the North Korean tests?

Foreign Policy places Japan at the top of their The List: The Next Nuclear States. Why? Japan’s long-lasting technological ability to produce a nuclear arsenal combined with its new found fear of a nuclear North Korea.

But isn't the Japanese public extremely pacifist and anti-nuclear?

Martin Flecker of the New York Times investigates the effect of North Korea’s nuclear test on Japanese public opinion:

If the North did explode a nuclear device, analysts said the effects on Japanese public opinion may take time to appear. That’s what happened after the North’s 1998 test firing a multistage Taepodong 2 missile over Japan. While Japan’s initial reaction was muted, public opinion ended up moving dramatically in favor of building a stronger defense.

In the following years, that allowed Japan to begin adding weapons that just a few years before would have been unthinkable. Among these were Japan’s first spy satellite, a troop transport ship now under construction that experts say could serve as a small aircraft carrier and aerial tankers that would allow Japanese fighter planes to reach North Korea and other countries.

Kyoko Altman’s Washington Post blog, Japan’s Exploding Nationalism, seems to agree with Flecker-- downplaying the recent rhetorical cooling of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (who earlier had stated support for a more militarized and nuclear Japan). Painting Japanese PM Shinzo Abe's recent gestures of reconciliation with China and South Korea as superficial, Altman concludes her post:

When the Korean Central News Agency issued the statement saying the nuclear test "greatly encouraged" those who "have wished to have a powerful self-reliant defense capability" it could also have been speaking for Japan. One crucial difference: If the world's second largest economy resolves to build a nuclear weapon, there will be no need to question whether it will work.

But the Los Angeles Times offers a more nuanced assessment of Japan’s nuclear posture. Rather than looking Japanese security in a nuclear vacuum, Bruce Wallace fleshes out the conservative agenda of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. But he also points to the strong anti-nuclear sentiment of Japan:

But the new prime minister has tried to crush any suspicion that he favors taking Japan nuclear. Abe wants to avoid creating a hothouse atmosphere that could imperil his ambitious conservative agenda of domestic reforms. The core of his program, from rewriting the pacifist constitution to restoring patriotism and traditional Japanese values in education, is a radical challenge to the postwar order that is the legacy of the U.S. occupation.

To pave the way, Abe has moved within his first month in office to assuage criticism that he is a hawk whose policies will lead to a renewed militarism. He made trips to Beijing and Seoul that, on the surface at least, have improved Tokyo's relations with those capitals. Keeping the Chinese relationship on track is particularly crucial to Abe, and press reports here this week said the prime minister had assured visiting Chinese officials that Japan has no intention of developing a nuclear arsenal.

The North Korean bomb offers those three countries a window to come together against a new threat, even if they disagree on how to discourage Kim Jong Il from further belligerence. Keeping the focus on North Korea's capabilities also provides Japan with political cover to continue modernizing its military.

Tom Plate, in his New Nation editorial, demands we not overreact to North Korea's recent nuclear tests:

The shaking could be due to the mass collapse of thousands upon thousands of North Koreans from starvation, or even from the raucous rattling of malfunctioning test rockets that come crashing to the ground shortly after take-off. Some day perhaps, an odd and ominous sound may be triggered by the surprise thud of a thunderous Chinese coup against Pyongyang.

Don't laugh. This most unlikable regime's widely publicised boast of having conducted a small explosion cannot paper over the fact that North Korea is a pouting paper tiger. To keep things in perspective, the alleged nuclear test was minute in size so small, in fact, that a conventional explosion could have had the same seismic impact.

Hoax or not, fear often spreads disproportionately to reality.

Conclusion: Abe's Smart Diplomacy and Japan's Non-Nuclear Stance

So what does this all mean? Will Japan prusue nuclear weapons in the near future?

Chisaki Watanabe’s Associated Press piece makes it clear that Japan will not join the nuclear club tomorrw. It is also clear that any argument for an evitable Japanese nuclear arsenal is non-sense. Such a perspective oversimplifies Japan's security situation, and reflects the poor neo-realist logic that led Kenneth Waltz to predict a German nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War Era. (For those of you who don't track proliferation, we’ve been waiting for over 10 years for that prognostication to be borne out).

Barring some exogenous shock, I don't foresee any change in Japan's nuclear posture anytime soon. North Korea is not a grave threat to Japanese security; Japan's nuclear taboo is still strong; the American-Japanese relationship is solid; and, probably most significantly, Prime Minister Abe can't afford to get trapped in a nuclear quagmire before achieving other important political aims.

Given Japan's already considerable and emerging military capabilities, keeping the nuclear partially openned (as Abe has done by pledging 1) not to go nuclear but 2) to have an national discussion on the subject) serves Japanese diplomatic ends better than actually obtaining nuclear weapons.

So what does this mean for proliferation-trackers? Keep your focus on the Middle East, not Asia.

2006-10-16T13:26:00.000-07:00

The Other N. Korean Nuclear Fall Out: An Imperiled U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

Has North Korea's recent nuclear test in Hwaderi killed the U.S. India nuclear deal?

The upcoming Outlook Magazine (Outlook India's weekly magazine) offers this article discussing new Indian apprehension about the other political fallout of the North Korean nuclear test: an imperiled nuclear deal.

Here's some background for those not hip to the U.S.-India nulcear beat.

In March, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a nuclear deal between the United States and India. The U.S. agreed to supply nuclear materials to India. In return India pledged to separate its nuclear program into civilian and military components, and allow international inspections of their civilian nuclear sector.

The catch? The deal provides India fissile material which can be easily used to bolster its India's nuclear arsenal.

The deal also offers India de-facto nuclear legitimacy from America. India announced its entry to the nuclear club in in 1998, to the great consternation of the international community. While not breaking international law--they did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)--the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal puts America (a leading NPT member) in the uneasy position of providing nuclear supplies to a state that has flouted counter-proliferation norm.

At a time when the administration is aggressively fighting to stop the nuclear enrichment program of Iran, many critics consider the nuclear deal setting a dangerous diplomatic double standard.

Opponents also worry that other recognized nuclear powers (which include France, China, Britain, and Russia) may replicate this nuclear deal with other countries. While perhaps not spreading WMD ingredients to worrisome regimes, some contend that any proliferation is inherently dangerous to global security. (For more from deal opponents, go here to see an article by CAP's Larry Korb and Peter Ogden)

North Korea's recent nuclear test has only served to fuel such concerns.

Proponents of the deal counter that the international community must engage, not ignore today's non-recognized nuclear powers (who include Israel and Pakistan). Supporters further contend that India has been an ideal nuclear power, not proliferating nuclear technology or needlessly imperiling global stability with their weapons. These voices argue that good behavior must be rewarded, not shunned. (For a more detailed pro-deal argument, go here).

But all sides of the debate agree that the U.S.-India deal represents a transitional moment into proliferation diplomacy. While older treaties, such as the NPT, seek to maintain one set of nuclear rules universally, the U.S.-India deal adopts a country-specific approach.

So where is the deal now? Caught in legislative limbo. While passed by the House of Representatives by an overwhelming majority, its frozen in the Senate until the lame duck session following November's mid-term elections.

With an unpopular war in Iraq and North Korea so dominant in this election cycle, don't expect much talk about the India nuclear deal by either the Administration officials or Congressional candidates.

But for opponents of the India deal, North Korea's nuclear gambit may have given them just what they need to to run out the legislative clock on this controversial deal.

(This article was printed earlier on CampusProgress.org, but will be updated throughout the day-- unlike its CP predecessor).

2006-09-07T11:26:00.000-07:00

Short Newsread: Newsweek Takes on the US-India Nuclear Deal

Henry Sokolski writes in yesterday's Weekly Standard his thoughts on the US-India nuclear deal. It's a well-written piece (far more lively than my ramblings), and perhaps shows any readers out there that I'm not just spewing crazy talk.

2006-08-15T11:22:00.000-07:00

India Deal Update: The Formation of the "Nuclear Club" and the Pivotal Role of the Indian President

Rashtrapati Bhavan witnessed an 'on the fly' meeting between President APJ Abdul Kalam and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, according to the Press Trust of India. This highlights the rather tough times PM Singh has faced within India on the issue of national security.

Yesterday brought Singh two undesired developments. First a group of respected Indian scientists sent Parliament an open letter calling on it to reject changes in the India-US nuclear deal made by United States House of Representatives. And now political opponents have now criticized Singh's Independence Day speech for 'Fail[ing] to inspire confidence that India shall relentlessly pursue an independent foreign policy."

In short, political opponents are saying, 'Not only has the Prime Minister made a bad deal, he's not even asserting India's sovereignty on its own independence day: how can Indians support this?'

Does this concern over the N-deal protray PM Singh and his Congress Party (the leading portion of the UPA ruling coalition) as lame-duck rulers?

No. But it does reflect the limitations of the ruling coalition and its opponents strategy back to power. Also it suggests that the White House's gamble on the nuclear deal may not bring back the diplomatic diviends they have promised the American people and political supporters.

The Congress Party and its UPA coalition has strong support within India. In fact, a recent poll showed had elections been held last month the Congress Party would be only a few seats away from a one-party majority. While Singh is not the most popular of the Congress Pack, his 12% approval rating blows away his national rival BJP's L.K. Advani 1.9%.

But these ratings show the tumultuous nature of Indian politics: even popular leaders have clear weaknesses that may endanger their legislative agenda and power at any moment.

And one of the chief weaknesses of the Congress Party is the charge that it is ceding India's independence in foreign affairs to US power. Central to this national security debate is the India-US nuclear deal.

The "Nuclear Club" Against the N-Deal grows

The Indian Express documents the growth of India's "Nuclear Club". This group of political figures, spanning left to right and including Congress Party members, is plotting the political repudiation of the nuclear deal. While these figures may not agree on domestic policies, they are united in fighting any "American tilt" within Indian foreign policy.

The particular concerns with the nuclear deal are expressed concisely within a recent letter by Indian scientists that stands against recent revisions in the deal. These changes were made by the US House of Representatives, and will most likely proliferate when the US Senate takes up the deal in September.

The letter has four chief points: 1) criticizing international monitoring of Indian nuclear facilities, 2) questioning the implementation of international safeguard within indigenous nuclear facilities, 3) a demand for autonomous indigenous R&D, and 4) a call for Parliament to ensure such developments, viewed as a threat to Indian national security, do not occur.

These particular issues point to the one sentiment that binds these scientists with the "Nuclear Club": India must have a completely independent foreign policy for maximum security. As such the India-US nuclear deal is considered deleterious to Indian interests by binding India to the United States. The Bush administration has made no secret of its hope that the India-US nuclear deal is a strong step into transforming India and America from friends to strategic partners.

India at a Diplomatic Crossroads: Will the President Decide?

The Indian President may play a pivotal role within the Indian security debate. Known as 'India's Missile Man', Abdul Kalam played a critical role in India's 1998 nuclear tests and, as such, holds strong security credentials to many Indians. His own Indepedence Speech, while not speaking of the India Deal directly, stressed the nation's need to prusue an indepedent nuclear energy policy.

The President's say on the India deal could determine its success or failure. He has already been called upon by opposition political parties to come out against the deal. No doubt, Singh today sought both the President's illusive position on the deal and how it could affect its chances for success.

And to complicate things even more, Kalam's term is coming to an end. And within the current political climate and past practice, these are the twilight days of the Kalam presidency.

Which way the President will go is uncertain. Could he be biding his time to come out publicly against the nuclear deal, in order to maxmize his influence? Or is it that his his silence is the best approach against the deal. Such silence suggested his opposition, empowering opponents who are now just coming into a political force against the deal while preserving his office's ceremonial status. In any case, charting the President's action in the next months-- which will witness the US Senate Debate and discussions within the Nuclear Supplier Group and IAEA.

Conclusion: 'Hawk vs. Hawk' Debate

This articles all point to a trend Proliferation Press has repeatedly asserted: the key pitfall of the treaty lies not within the United States but within India. Furthermore, the deal has brought out a clear 'hawk vs. hawk' national security debate within the country that must be of extreme worry to analysts concerns with regional proliferation. Indian opponents are coming out against a deal that essentially gives India all of the nuclear genie without any firm commitments. While the deal would give the US a close ear to India's defense capabilities, this is no way suggests India will curtail its military nuclear program. While the scientists' letter suggests that all Indian nuclear facilities would be faced with international monitoring, the deal ony calls for monitoring of domestic facilities (meaning sites desiginated as non-military by the Indian government). Thus this security debate is not really about India's independent nuclear development (of critical importance in US debates over the deal) but rather one over diplomatic trajectories: should it continue to chart an independent course or push closer to the United States? The net-result: Indian will be modernizing its nuclear forces without any real constraints.

The Bush administration has found the NPT framework as unable to control the region in regards to proliferation. In its wake it has adopted one of hegemony: offering India a nuclear deal that gives it supplies and technical know-how in return for American influence. Unfortunately its still an open question as to whether this approach can work. And most troublesome, is the precedent the nuclear deal has set for all nations who have elected not to develop a nuclear capability.

In many ways the nuclear deal was a needless attempt to push two countries together by using the most controversial issue between them. Commerical ties and a common regime type have bound the nations. Now US prestige is tied to the deal. And more importantly, the US must ensure this deal does not usher in a new race to proliferation. This last issue goes far beyond the scope of this current article, but shows the importance of the India-US deal's outcome within the international system.

Sources

Scientists voice concerns over Nuke deal
Srinivas Laxman
15 Aug, 2006 0247hrs; Isttimes News Network
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1894089.cms

Indian scientists oppose new clauses in nuclear deal
Monday, August 14, 2006; 12:06 PM; Reuters
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081400437.html

Scientists speak out against nuclear deal with U.S.
Monday, August 14, 2006 : 1825 Hrs; The Hindu
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200608141860.htm

PM has unscheduled meet with President
Tuesday, August 15, 2006 (New Delhi); Press Trust of India
http://www.ndtv.com/morenews/showmorestory.asp?category=National&slug=PM+has+unscheduled+meet+with+President&id=91562

Text of Indian PM's Address to Nation
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200608150921.htm

PM fails to inspire confidence on India's foreign policy: Left
Tuesday, August 15, 2006 : 1325 Hrs; The Hindu
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200608151810.htm

India's ruling coalition can win parliament majority: survey
New Delhi, Aug 13; Indo-Asian News Service (IANS)
http://www.newkerala.com/news4.php?action=fullnews&id=6334

As they sharpened axe, he dined with Amar, Yashwant to take on the n-deal
Vrinda Gopinath, Indian Express
Posted online: Wednesday, August 09, 2006 at 0000 hrs
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/10210.html

N-advice from Prez, scientists
Vinod Sharma and Aloke Tikku, Hindustan Times
New Delhi, August 14
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/5922_1769295,0015002500000000.htm

2006-07-27T11:31:00.000-07:00

Mixed News from Libya: Successful HEU Extraction, Failed Nuclear Trial

The Washington Post and the United Press International reported today on the successful extraction of 6.6 pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Libya and the past removal of 37 pounds of HEU in 2004.

The joint venture brought together the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, Russia (where the material originated), and the IAEA.

The recently removed HEU from Tripoli will now be sent to Russia, where it will be blended into low enriched uranium: a much less dangerous substance with US and IAEA supervision.

This latest action shows the transformation of Libya from an isolated, terror-sponsoring nation to 'responsible' nation status. Such a powerful case of counter-proliferation has not been seen since the successful removal of nuclear weapons from former Soviet states after the fall of the Soviet Union.

How the Downblend Process Works

If this current program is following past US-Russian agreements to downblend uranium, the process detailed by Elena Sokova will take place:

Several Russian facilities are involved in the HEU blend-down process, from warhead dismantlement to dilution into LEU. First, Russian nuclear warheads are dismantled at nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly facilities. Following this, HEU components are shipped to the Siberian Chemical Combine (in Seversk) and the Mayak Production Association (in Ozersk), where they are turned into metal shavings and then converted into uranium oxide (U3O8). The U3O8 is then converted into highly enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at either the Siberian Chemical Combine or the Krasnoyarsk Electrochemical Plant (in Zelenogorsk). These two facilities, as well as the Ural Electrochemical Combine (in Novouralsk), dilute the UF6 to produce LEU with a concentration of uranium-235 below 5%. (For more information on this process, refer to the Megatons to Megawatts section of the USEC website.) The LEU is then packaged and shipped via St. Petersburg to the United States. Upon receipt of the LEU, USEC pays TENEX. Once in the United States, USEC may alter the LEU enrichment level according to its customers' specifications, or send the LEU unaltered to a US commercial nuclear-fuel fabricator.[1]

Botched German Libyan Nuclear Trial

But this good news on the proliferation front, comes along with the sorry conclusion of Gotthard Lerch's trial in Mannheim, GER on charges that he had aided Libya's nuclear program (as reported today in The Guardian). Facing charges that he had violated German anti-proliferation regulations, the judge today threw out the case citing the prosecutions refusal to share evidence with the defense.

If found guilty of accepting 8 million euros in return for helping to bring about a nuclear Libya, Lerch would have faced up to 15 years in prison.

IranWatch, a site dedicated to exposing Iran's illicit nuclear and missile proliferation, has the following description of Lerch:

A German businessman, reportedly identified by Libya and Iran as being involved in their acquisition of uranium enrichment technology as a middleman associated with Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation network; formerly in charge of an industrial technology and metallurgy division at Leybold-Heraeus (now part of Unaxis AG), a producer of high-technology equipment allegedly involved in the supply of nuclear equipment to Pakistan and Iraq in the 1980s, where he was reportedly implicated by German authorities along with co-worker Otto Heilingbrunner in the illegal export to Switzerland of blueprints and construction plans for uranium enrichment plant components; alleged to have tried and failed to obtain supplies of pipes for Libya's Project Machine Shop 1001, allegedly planned by Peter Griffin, a British citizen and alleged longtime supplier to Khan, to be a workshop in Libya to make centrifuge components that could not be obtained from outside Libya; reportedly admitted to supplying Pakistan valves, vacuum pumps, brazing furnaces, measuring instruments and a gas-purifying plant in the 1980s, much of which was reportedly shipped to Pakistan by way of Switzerland, France and Dubai; currently resides in Switzerland. [2]

While not blocking the pathway for a retrial, such a development suggests a weak case against this suspected proliferator. This most likely reflects the inherent difficulty of punishing individuals or corporations that aid nations in illicit proliferation.

Sources

"U.S. officials get Libya to return uranium," UPI Security and International. July 27, 2006.
"More nuclear fuel removed from Libya, US says," Reuters. July 26, 2006. Accessed through the Washington Post.
Traynor, Ian. "First trial over Libya'a nuclear bomb plan collapses," Guardian Unlimited. July 27, 2006.

[1] Elena Sokova; "Russia: Overview of the US-Russian HEU-LEU Program." NTI. May 2, 2005.
[2] IranWatch. Taken from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

2006-07-25T13:22:00.000-07:00

US-India Nuclear Deal Roundup:
The Final 'Press' Blitz of the US-India Nuclear Deal in the US House of Representatives; A Defense of ElBaradei; India's Reaction

Today and tomorrow will witness two key votes that change current US laws on the shipment of nuclear materials to India. The removal of these obstacles then allows US-India nuclear cooperation to commence.

As numerous news-sources show, yesterday and today are showing signs of one last push of N-deal opponents to influence the vote in House.

The central figure in this press blitz is Representative Edward Markey (D-MA). This is not surprising as is co-founder of the Congressional Bipartisan Taskforce on Nonproliferation.

Markey, along with Reps. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) of the Armed Services Committee and Barbara Lee (D-CA) of the International Relations Committee, sent a letter to Condoleezza Rice demanding the prompt release of a semi-annual report on all persons or companies engaged in illicit proliferation activities (for an example refer back to this earlier blog entry).

Knowing that such a report would no doubt have Indian persons and companies on it, these Representatives are hoping to use this demand to win some votes against the nuclear deal. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that either the report will be released or the vote will go the way its critics would desire.

The request did provide fodder for some editorials: the San Diego Daily Transcript and the San Francisco Chronicle. While the keyword "India" is the most searched item within the New York Time's search engine, there is no recent editorial devoted to the subject or the upcoming Congressional vote.

Looking to the State Department website, one finds that the administration had an easy way out of Markey's attempt at a news-cycle stunt: talk about everything else. Even with today' s admission that the administration knew of and suppressed knowledge of Pakistani plans for a new plutonium enrichment center (with the express purpose of enlarging their nuclear weapons capability), the news from Lebanon and Iraq is drowning out any prolonged focus on this news-item. Between Bush's meeting with the Iraqi Prime Minister and Rice's meeting with the Lebanese President, there is little space for major news outlets to devote to this story.

But the India-US deal has yet to clear every hurdle.

The Senate will not vote on the deal until after its summer recess, giving time for opponents to more effectively use the recent disclosure of the Pakistani plant and any upcoming State Department Report to either pick off supporters or add amendments.

In fact, it seems that the amendment route is the way-- along with stepping up pressure on international organizations-- for opponents to most effectively diminish the deal's enactment.

India's Demand for 'Strings Free' Deal

Kay Benedict, a reporter for the Indian 'Daily News Analysis', points out domestic opposition to the legislative package in India. For details on domestic opposition to aspects of the US legislation refer to this past blog. Central to this discussion is the direct opposition now lodged against the deal by CPI.

Such a development shows the formation of an anti-Congress party bloc (India's ruling coalition) to the nuclear deal. Prakash Karat, General Secretary for CPI, calls the deal a 'trap' and brings up nine points of concern. At the center of all these concerns are perceived attempts by Washington to limit India's independent ability to pursue its nuclear policy-- both in regards to energy and weapons.

The tough road for Indian support for nuclear deal must be included in American attempts to bloc the deal. Opponents have found it much easier to give fodder to Indian nationalists against the deal than changing the votes of their fellow representatives. Much of this owes to the different priorities of each country: for India this deal is top-news, whereas in the United States there is small time to make this a central issue on which to campaign for or against.

Thus one finds that opponents are not so much trying to defeat the bill as make it unpalatable to India. Further, cautious supporters are ensuring that if India acts against US proliferation interested that there is ample space for an American reaction. For both groups, the status of the 'deal' as merely a law revision as opposed to a 'treaty' has played an integral part in the debate. While such a strategy both downplayed the act to the public and helped bring smooth sailing in US Congress, but it has brought ill-effects as well for the Bush administration's goals.

First, this non-treaty status has made it easy for opponents to demand that the Indian waiver on US laws nuclear export laws be temporary and not permanent: making it the President's decision whether or not to continue uranium transfers. As such, any moment in which India is seen as a 'irresponsible' nuclear power (a nuclear testing, large development of weapons, etc.), anti-deal legislators will be able to pressure the President into revoking the deal. Given Bush's weak approval ratings and the fact that a proliferatoring India would grab headlines, it seems this backdoor approach is the most likely to succeed.

Further it has allowed non-binding and language amendments to be added to the deal. While these are not of critical importance within the United States (where the Bush administration will be its own legal interpretor), in India these changes have caused huge problems in drumming up domestic support for the deal. Non-biding amendments such as encouraging India to favor the US position on Iran or join the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty have been deal-breakers to many opponents in India.

Indian Strategy: Unanimous Resolution

The solution for Indian critics is to have a unanimous resolution passed on the parameters of the nuclear deal. By Paraliament passing a unamious resolution (specifically excluding some parts of the US legislation), it is hoped that India will get the deal without the coniditions.

As Express News Service points out, such a strategy made it easier for the past Indian Prime Minister to resist calls from Bush to send troops to Iraq. When Bush made a request, the PM would point out that his entire Paraliament passed a motion to the contrary-- effectively setting policy for him.

But Indian troops in Iraq and nuclear transactions are very seperate ends. It will be interesting such a development could send to Senators after the summer recess.

Putting Pressure on the IAEA

Also today was harsh critique of El Baradei's support for the India Nuclear Deal by a group of proliferation experts (letter has yet to be tracked down). Such a piece reflects the transitional role Baradei (rightly) is guiding the IAEA. While some may say its inconsistent for the IAEA to support the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it chief duty is to ensure a transparent and safe nuclear environment: both goals that cannot be met if its divorces itself from American interests, completely.

Yet, what is interesting about the critique is that it judges before the verdict is in. ElBaradei has yet to have his voice heard fully on the details of the inspection regime India will receive. While currently the US-India deal calls for only 'non-military' Indian installations to be monitored, how this is enacted has yet to be seen.

Whether the India passed Congress or India is not the key step to focus on. The real 'prime time' event will be the long and detail orientated discussion among the NSG and IAEA. It is this step that will provide the evidence for cursing or crediting ElBaradei.

So before those are too critical on ElBaradei, perhaps they should first step back and realize he is maximizing the likelihood that this deal will not cause destabilize proliferation. To do so he is open to charges of inconsistency, but he is guaranteeing an increased (not silenced) voice for the IAEA in the future. That is something 1) to cheer and 2) incredibly difficult to achieve.

2006-07-22T11:50:00.000-07:00

News-Cycle Roundup: Updates in the World of Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense Systems

Israel's Non-Use of Anti-Missile Systems

In a very thorough and well written report, Victoria Samson explains why the world has not seen Israel respond its recent missile threat by activating their two-tiered anti-missile system.

She explains the two-tiered system, using an early form of the US Patriot System and an Arrow System, is unable to defend Israel form the short-ranged attacks used by Hezzbolah. This newly percieved threat by Israel-- a Hezzbolah armed with thousands of weapons Israel cannot stop-- helps explain Israel "disproportionate response" Israel is currently enacting in Lebanon.

Interestingly, Isreal recently rejected plans to produce the Northrop Grumman Corporation's Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser (MTHE) system. This system is now seen in a recent US press release as the 'right' solution for the threat of short-ranged missiles. We'll see if Northup Gruman finds a way to recoup the Israeli loss of business in the US.

Austraila's Broken System

Owing to poor decision-making by the Austrailian Defense Agency, it seems a already paid for missile defense system for Hornett planes will have to forever lay unused. Why? It seems the system cannot be integrated into the plane.

The loss: $200 million and airdefense for pilots.

Making a Real Axis of 'Evil'? Iranian presence at N. Korean Missile Testing

The US State Department has publicly disclosed its suspicion that representatives for the Iranian government were present at the recent North Korean missile test.

Such a disclosure comes at a curious time: while the US is blaming Iran for the Lebanese crisis and stepping up pressure to open the option of sanctions if Iran does not respond to the recent nuclear proposal.

Not a bad move to put Iran and North Korea together: UN cooperation on the North Korean problem has been quicker to forge. Placing these two nations together may help turn away recent Russian opposition towards the idea of sanctions on Iran. Getting China and Russia on the same page as the US would increase the liklihood of international diplomacy curbing Iranian nuclear ambitions. To see a detailed reasoning behind such a position, read this recent TIME article by Elaine Shannon.

US-Japan Anti-Missile Sytem Cooperation

The United States will be deploying its PAC-3 Anti-Missile System-- an advanced Patriot System-- in southern Japan. The surface-to-air system will be run by 600 US troops, and will be expanded to Japanese installations latter in the year.

The build-up reflects fears of the North Korean missile program and also strengthening ties between the United States and Japan in the face of a burgeoning Chinese power in the region. One can get a sense of growing power of China in this Taiwenese press release demanding more concern be expressed in the international community at China's arms build-up.

2006-07-22T11:19:00.000-07:00

Proliferation News Update: Economist Comes Out Against US-India Nuclear Deal

In an article posted today, the Economist urges other nations to find "the courage of their anti-proliferation convictions" and stand up to India and the United States.

For the complete text, click here.

2006-07-20T11:51:00.000-07:00

Britain on Path to Revamping Nuclear Deterrent

Brown's smooth moves & Looking Ahead to Parliamentary Debate

Updating an earlier posting on Gordon Brown's commitment to revamping Britain's nuclear deterrent, Jack Straw (once Foreign Minister now Commons Leader) has promised a full parliamentary debate and vote on the measure before any decision is made (reported in the Guardian earlier today).

This latest political maneuver reflects the attempt of Blair & Gordon to give weight to Labour concerns with the proposal, while also guaranteeing that the Trident nuclear force is updated.

As James Kirkup points out in the Scotsman, Gordon Brown's deterrent announcement in June was unexpected and caused considerable anger among 'traditional' Labour supporters (Greens and Union groups). Yet, it was also a necessary one: Brown needs prove his security credentials before his long awaited raise to Prime Minister. Such thinking reflect fears that Labour today may be seen as Labour in 1983, when the party wrote "longest suicide note in history": placing in their party manifesto a commitment to full, unilateral nuclear disarmament.

So it seems that Brown has successfully proved his 'independence' from 'traditional Labour' but still has permitted them their time to vent. This political move was shrewd: surprise announcement (Brown shows leadership and minimized any attempt by opponents in the party to block the proposal since the public a) supports the move and b) the evitable 'follow the leader' effect), followed by the expected anger in the backbench, now followed by a lengthy debate and vote which 1) allows the backbench to moan and grown and 2) still spells success for the revamped deterrent owing to Conservative support.

Gordon and Blair have successfully played the expectations game. Knowing that any proposal would--barring a shocking development-- pass, they minimized any backlash by showing things could always be worse: Brown's earlier announcement committed Britain to revamping its nuclear deterrent without any floor vote. Now by agreeing/'caving' on the need for a full debate, Gordon and Blair 'appear' to have given in these opposing voices: making it easier for these groups prove to their supporters they have achieved something, while still failing to actually change the policy.

Net-result: a controversial policy within Labour is adopted without alienating supporters.

But what is the exact plan?

What will be interesting is how the government presents this plan to opponents both within and outside Labour (meaning the Social Democrats). What will be the exact details of the revamped deterrence plan? And finally, how will Labour-- while updating their nuclear force-- still project 1) Britain as a role model for counter-proliferation and 2) Labour critical role in both keeping Britain strong but also in line with 'progressive' policies.

All these questions and more will be answered with the actual commencement of parliamentary debate. And I'll be sure to bring it to you here in condensed form, at Proliferation Press.

References

"MPs will get nuclear deterrent vote"; Guardian Unlimited. July 20, 2006.

Kirkup, James. "Britain 'will keep' nuclear deterrent" ; The Scotsman. June 22, 2006.

"Gordon Brown reaffirms Britain's 'Independent Nuclear Deterrent'"; Proliferation Press. June 26th, 2006.

2006-07-19T17:09:00.000-07:00

News Roundup: The Threat of Missile Proliferation & the Current Crisis in Lebanon

The crisis in Lebanon points to another dimension of WDM proliferation: short to medium range missile proliferation. The links below helps explain 1) what weapons are being used against Israel, 2) how they got there, and 3) why they are there in the first place. I'll be posting a more in depth discussion on this topic (or linking to one) latter this week.

Hutchison, Harold. "Where Terrorists Get Their Missiles"

AFP, "Hezbollah ready for long war against Israel"

Hendawi, Hazma. "Lebanon battles raise Hezbollah questions"

Mark Mazzetti and Thom Shanker. "Hezbollah's Unexpected Firepower"

ISN Security Watch. "Behind Iran's tough talk"

New, Very Good Report: PINR; ''The Role of Iran and Syria in the Israel-Lebanon Crisis''
***[added 7/20]***

Very Good, Concise History of Hezbollah: The Reliant; "In Focus: Hezbollah Prolife."
***[added 7/25]***

2006-07-19T14:45:00.000-07:00

The Topsy-Turvey Path to Approval: US Congress and the India Nuclear Deal

As reported in the Indian Tribune, Senator Lugar has confirmed that a final vote on the US-India Nuclear Deal ( a legalistic bundle of exemptions to certain nuclear-commerce laws for India along with conditions) will not be voted on before the Congressional summer recess, which begins August 4th. Lugar made these comments to reporters after a speech to the US India Friendship Council, a interest group for the US Indian community.

There have been numerous reactions to this announcement, reflecting vastly divergent viewpoints on the legislation now awaiting floor votes in Congress.

The US State Department, in a recent Press Release, makes light of the delay. The article states that US Senators "praise" the India deal, while making no mention of the announcement that more time would be needed before a final vote. (For those of you interested, here is a transcript of a recent speech by Condoleezza Rice to the group).

No where mentioned is the following statement by Lugar in regards to the proposed legislation (which was also made to reporters after his speech):

"Now there are some in our state Department, there are some in the Indian Foreign Office who say, "listen, those Senators, those members of the House changed the language here a little bit. This is not exactly what we signed on to. What about this little addition here and that one there?"... This is the deliberative process...I believe the changes are constructive; but even if they are controversial, I am hopeful that statesmen on both sides, India and the United States, will not be so adamant that somehow or other this is delayed."

These "little" changes are making big ripples. From India, we have S Ragotham (in his article Nuclear deal: What 'ironclad' guarantees?) slamming Bush for not standing by his initial stand earlier this year-- blanket exemption from current US laws on proliferation. While he sees the bill as sailing through Congress, he suggests that India might (and should) reject it. Why? He points to the bill's prohibition on further Indian nuclear weapons tests, the deal's status as a 'presidential waiver' (meaning a new administration could easily stop it), and the legislation explicit goal to ensure India does not use such cooperation towards nuclear armaments.

The Raghotham position is rather fantastic: suggesting India end its deal to the United States because the US dares to stop India from developing more nuclear weapons. The absence of any such language in the bill would go against America's obligations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which explicitly prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapon technology by any member-state) and would make any approval by skeptical nations within the Nuclear Supplier Group (which runs on a unanimous system) even harder to receive.

But whether or not Raghotham is out of step or not is not the central point. What is truly worrisome in Ragotham's article is the notion that the NPT prohibitions on nuclear weapons proliferation do not and should not apply to India. While one can consider his position merely that of a strong nationalist (how can a country stop another country from pursuing its interests), such a mentality highlights the risk to global non-proliferation posed by the India deal.

If India is rewarded with nuclear supplies and technology by virtue of it respecting or being a part of the NPT, what does that tell current member states who now restrain from proliferation (based on the premise that their abstention means every other nation's abstention)?

Also what happens when the deal gets passed (for it will be passed regardless of language concerns) and one finds India using it to increase its nuclear weapons stock-pile? Normally this would be a controllable problem: India is an NPT-outlier and not subject to its prohibitions. But when the United States (a dispository power of the treaty) is seen helping India violate the intent of the Treaty (curbing the proliferation of weapons), what weight does the Treaty have or America's call to control other aspiring proliferators (North Korea and Iran)?

Now this might not be a problem for Ragotham: he seems to only wish to maximize Indian security interests and is profoundly paranoid of American interests. Yet, what happens when such a deal leads to other countries (Egypt or Saudi Arabia) producing their own weapons or increasing and modernizing their current forces (China and Pakistan)? Such a development does two things: 1) takes away the very prestige India has received from this 'special' nuclear package by diluting the nuclear genie and 2) erodes their security situation. This is not even to mention the risk of nuclear terrorist attacks, fears which have been given new credence by the recent attacks in Mumbai.

Such observations seem to refute Bush administration arguments that the N-deal would bring India into the counter-proliferation fold. While it does crave out a position for them, a exceptional one, it has so far failed to inculcate the norms behind the NPT: chiefly that nuclear weapons are destablizing forces within the international system. If anything the deal has heightened demands within India for a 'free hand' when it comes to its nuclear decisions. While some may be sympathetic to such a position (for the US and others have done the same for decades), what happens when 2, 5 or 10 more nations-- stable or otherwise-- request the same treatment? And to top it off, there is no longer any effective measure to stop them-- short of hard force.

Suddenly the world looks a lot more grim.

The India deal is fundamentally flawed: giving India nuclear supplies without demanding that all its nuclear sites (not just non-military, as defined by them) or a guarantee adopt either the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty or NPT turned a diplomatic deal into a 'gift' to India. And with such a negative response from common-sense and necessary language amendments from Congress, it seems this 'gift' has not come with the promised healthy and understanding partnership between India and the United States.

But while flawed, the deal does not guarantee failure: with the right enactment, NSG amendments and IAEA inspection protocols disaster can be avoided. Furthermore, future administrations (as the legislation coming out of Congress emphasizes US executive flexibility by its 'waiver' component) will have a crack at modifying any problems with the deal latter. But in the meantime, this much is clear: there will be two more months of 'nuclear spin' coming out of the US Congress, the White House, and India.

References

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060720/world.htm#1
http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/jul/19guest1.htm
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1747546,001301790001.htm
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/68794.htm
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/11/mumbai.blasts/index.html
http://www.us-indiafriendshipcouncil.org/

2006-07-19T11:39:00.000-07:00

Australia's Future as 'Energy Superpower'?

A Glimpse into the New World of Counter-Proliferation

The Daily Telegraph reported yesterday on Austrailan Prime Minister Howard's speech to theCommittee for Economic Development of Australia. Of his lengthy address, one line has gotten the attention of many foreign relations observers-- not to mention his own constituents and political rivals):

"With the right policies, we have the makings of an energy superpower." Austraila a superpower? How can this be.

Austraila's Uranium

Austraila holds 30% of the world's low-cost uranium (map). While the industry shut down in the 1971 had come to a complete stand-still, new times bring with them new demand. With a surging demand for long-term power solutions and weapons news, Austraila has found itself as the last great, stable area for uranium exploration. Such a demand is leading to strange bed-fellows: China and Austrailia recently concluded a uranium deal. Guess 'Clash of Civilizations' is out, 'Energy Compatriots' is in:

"Australia's energy exports are forecast to grow to around $45 billion in 2006-07, more than three times what we earned last year from meat, grains and wool combined...Australia can, and should, supply the domestic and world economies with low-cost energy."

Domestic Opposition

Howard's comments have both an international and domestic aim. On the domestic front, Howard boasts the best electoral record of any Aussie politican: being elected in 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004. Most speculation on Howard today revolves around when he will leave, but it is clear that Howard is not done pushing his image of Austrailia in regards to dometic power needs or Austrailia position in the international system. On the first front, it is interesting to note Austrailia, standing only with the United States, rejection of the Kyoto Protocol.

Critics charge that such pro-petrol policies have put Austrailia in sorry state in terms of long-term energy needs. Yet, Howard has answered this call: with nuclear power.

Such a stance is controversial in Austrailia: there is considerable support for more 'green' solutions, and still concern about the dangers of using nuclear power. But it is clear that Howard, like Bush, is pushing for nuclear power. And while some may claim such a policy keeps Austrailia away from lucrative, long-term investment in renewable energies, it comes with one large attraction: transforming Austrailia into world's first uranium-driven superpower.

Austrailia on the World Stage: Can it Fit into the America's Grand Vision of Counter-Proliferation

Pushing uranium is geo-political boast to Austrailia. Becoming the central pub to the world's growing appetite for nuclear materials spells success not only for the Austrailian economy but also its international prestige. Yet, would such a shift be welcomed by the international community?

President Bush is often assailed by critics as eroding the norm of counter-proliferation through revamped nuclear armament plans, special nuclear deals and disregard for international agreements. To counter this image of 'selective standards', the Bush administration has made early steps with Russia to make a 'rules based' system for nuclear power. At the recent G-8 meeting, upon announcing their own nuclear cooperation deal, Bush and Putin announced their goal of providing all nations the ability to obtain nuclear energy.

Such a plan seeks to control nuclear proliferation not by controlling the raw resource (uranium or plotunium) but rather its enrichment. The plans allows nations to get their uranium enriched in another country, then have it used for their respective power needs, with reminder supplies being returned back to the site of enrichment. Such a plan keeps the main ingredient of weapons --excess highly enriched uranium-- out of the hands of non-enriching nations. Such a plan finds its roots in a past proposal to solve the Iranian nuclear stand-off: have Russia provide Iran with nuclear fuel and then having the used materials returned, ensuring that enriched uranium could not be used to construct weapons. In short the rule would be as follows: nuclear power 'yes', 'no' to uranium enrichment.

While on face this plan may seem to solve some problems, it isn't really different from the 'legalistic fiction' of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: all nations with legal enrichment facilities continue to monopolize it, while getting to choose who or who not to give materials too. Furthermore the new framework (by going away from the NPT) seems to open the way for all depository members (those nations with 'legal' nuclear weapons) to caste away any fidelity to the long-term goal of nuclear weapon abolition-- a central principle of the NPT.

But what dose Austrailia have to do with this plan? Austrailia's PM Howard is pushing the envelop on this putative plan: hinting at Austrailia's desire to be added to the 'enricher' list. The addition of a staunch US ally makes attempts to codify the new norm of 'non-enrichment' exceedingly difficult. But it doesn't seem the United States can refuse: 1) it risks losing the most important uranium supplier of the centry and 2) it must face up to its own India precedent of 'trustworthy' nations getting special treatment. It would be hard for most members of the international community to consider Austrailia not 'trustworthy' enough to possess its own enrichment capability while green-lighting India. As such, Austrailia's addition would promise only further deadlock on the Iranian front. How can the United States drum up support to bar Iran from enrichment activities when it bends rules for its Aussie ally?

The New World: The Race for Energy Partnerships & Proliferation Solutions

So it seems the world system has fully entered a new stage: the race for nuclear energy. Such a development is understandable given dwindling oil supplies, yet it comes with a large risk: the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is still room for a norm reserval: in Austrailia the Labor could take over and push Austrailia off the path of energy super-power, being statisfied with clean energy and middle power status. On the American front, a new administration could revitalize the once strong and bi-partisan counter-proliferation voting bloc. Yet it seems both outcomes are unlikely. Will voters really support policies that diminish their nations' prestige and power in the age of terrorism? Can politicans really win on the 'detente' principle that safety depends on mutual danger? Unlikey.

But neither the extreme (the norm of counter-proliferation or extreme-proliferation) shows reality for policymakers today: in the middle is the nebulous ground of WDM proliferation management. How that middle ground will be shaped is of critical importance to our security. Below is the growing list of nuclear partnerships:

-Turkey-Russia

-China-Pakistan

-US-India

-France-India; (historical link)

-Russia-US

But such a growing list can be turned into a strong counter-proilferation wave: with a strong, international inspections regime by the IAEA. Having a robust, international inspection regime can allow nations to achieve their power needs but curtail dangerous weapons proliferation (and with Iraq, has been shown to partially succeed). Yet, before such a plan can be actualized, a clear notion of what benefits non-proliferators (whether they be satisfied states or revisionist) get from abstaining from abstaining. If they recieve no tangible benefit and watch other powers develop 'nuclear primacy', such a plan is doomed to failure. Yet if their is mutual sacriface on the part of major powers, concensus can be found to stop new proliferators.

Such an outcome is perhaps the hardest. Many proliferation analysts (and watchers like myself) feel that the best time to curb nuclear proliferation-- expressed by the Achaeson-Lilianthal Plan-- has long since passed. And attempts at internationally monitoring would have to buck a poor historical record. But it seems with the new dynamics of energy, freezing nuclear technology is impossible.

But management is still possible. But its come by making the right deicisions: whether it be in how we deal with an aging population of nuclear warheads, follow current treaties, seek to construct a meaningful inspection regime, or make effective nuclear deals with countries. Austrailia's role has yet to be defined. Furthermore, the plans for freezing enrichment nations has brought agreement between the US and Russia, two of the three heavyweights (add China) when it comes to international proliferation policy. One must closely watch the reaction to this proposal and see how it develops. One thing is clear: new solutions are needed. But any solution needs the right details (for example an inspection regime and clear pathyway to sanctions for violating countries) if it is to work.

References

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4731244.stm http://indiaenews.com/2006-07/15336-french-scientist-advices-caution-indias-n-programme.htm http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/15/AR2006071500398.html http://www.sea-us.org.au/uran-res.html

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19835472-12250,00.html

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0606/S00548.htm

http://www.news.com.au/dailytelegraph/story/0,22049,19828072-5001024,00.html

http://www.sea-us.org.au/overview.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acheson-Lilienthal_Report

2006-07-16T13:13:00.000-07:00

Proliferation Press Brings Back an Old News-Cycle

Rhetorical Escalation: The Imposition of US Sanctions on Chinese Companies accused of aiding Iran's Weapons Program and its Implications on the India Nuclear Deal and the Iranian Nuclear Dilemma

On June 13 the United States has banned all American companies and individuals from doing business with four Chinese companies and one American company. Why? Alleged aid to Iran's weapons program by aiding in missle design. (Note: from all the articles I've read the proper count is four total industries, three Chinese and one Chinese Represenative in America.)

This action comes as no great shock: all companies are repeat offenders. Yet, the actual imposition on sactions has brings with it 1) the expected Chinese response, 2) the US delivery and 3) timing.

The Sactioned Companies

China Daily and Aviation Now provide us with the details of the action. The three Chinese companies are Beijing Alite Technologies Company Ltd, LIMMT Economic and Trade Company Ltd and Great Wall Industry Corporation. The US-affiliated company is California-based GW Areospace International, the American representative for China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC).

Upon going to the web-site of CGWIC, one finds the following note:

"CGWIC is a responsible and credible state-owned company in China with its business scope focusing on international commercial launch services and the import and export of aerospace products, etc. During the past decades, CGWIC has conducted twenty-four international commercial launch missions and six piggyback missions, launching thirty satellites. Commercial satellites successfully launched by CGWIC cover more than 100 countries and regions in Asia, Europe, America and Australia, providing telecommunications services to 75% of the world population. Nine out of twelve geo-stationary satellites successfully launched provide direct services to Asia. CGWIC’s mission is to bring benefits to the humankind with space technology."

It goes on to demand that the sanctions be reversed and all finanical losses incurred be covered by the US government.

So what do all these companies have in common? They are all Chinese-owned and do business in Iran. Furthermore, as stated before, all of these companies are repeat offenders of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Looking to the US State Department's list of past activations of the 2000 Act, one finds that CGWIC was sanctioned in September of 2004, Bejing Alite in December 2004, and LIMMT in December 2005 for simliar activity.

Before we try to figure out the reason behind the recent rhetorical escalation (from sanctions being posted within dry US State Department notices to the US Teasury's bold press statement), what is the Iran NonProliferation Act of 2000?

National Export Controls & the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000

This bill basically serves as a supplement to the expired 1979 Export Administartion Act (introduced by Adalai Stevenson). This bill sought to formally gave the President the powers to curtail trade that was deemed dangerous to national security.

The 1979 Act was an update to an 1969 act, which followed the progenitor-- the 1949 Export Control Act. While the focus has shifted from fighting communism to fighting terrorism, the goal of all the acts are the same: to keep dangerous materials out of the hands of enemies of the United States, while maximizing the amount of trade that could be done.

Disputes between these competing goals are intense, perhaps ensuring that the 1979 Act would be renewed in 2001, only to expire the following year. In its wake, President Bush has kept the Act in force through Executive Order while Congress has explicitly delegated the executive powers in the case of Iran (the Iran NonProliferation Act of 2000).

The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, with the proper exceptions, allows the President to slap sanctions on companies or individuals that aid Iran in proliferation activities (both missile development and nuclear development). There is a review process, but only after the sanctions are levied and all violitions are able to be classified. This bill, coming before the first expiration of the Export Adiministration Act, showed the intense concern of Congress to Russian activity within Iran. The bill passed both houses of Congress unanimously, forcing then President Clinton to include a prohibition on aiding missile programs as well as nuclear technology.

While such a protocol is understandable when dealing with the proliferation activities of countries such as Russia and China, its easy to see how this Presidential power can be used politically. The Iran Nonproliferation Act failed to achieve the goal of many in 1979, best articulated by George Schultz to construct "rules instead of authorities - rules that we can read; rules that are predictable." In regards to an overall reauthorization of export controls, a 2001 attempt to reauthorize the bill by Congress succeeded, only to expire in 2002. In 2004 another reauthorization attempt failed to get a floor vote. As such, any imposition of sanctions comes with the expected response: foreign consternation at breaking unwritten rules.

The Chinese Response

China, unsurprising, has responded to this recent, bundled and country specific imposition of sanctions quite negatively. Denying any improper conduct, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu Press stated on June 15:

"The U.S. wrong practice severely undermines our non- proliferation cooperation and will not benefit the development of bilateral relations...We require the U.S. side to change their practice and abandon completely the wrong practice of sanction and pressure." (Global Security)

The Timing and Current Implications

Why did the United States release these stories in the press a month ago? Two potenial factors: the India nuclear deal and the Iranian nuclear row.

On the India nuclear deal, China now stands as the last, major impediment to clearance. With the recent G-8's decision to tacitly endorse the deal, China (the lone P-5 member not represented at the G-8) is left, along with Scandivanian countries and New Coalition Nations such as Ireland. Associating China with illict proliferation activities itself on the run-up to the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting makes any Chinese 'lecturing' ineffectual. Furthermore, it helps show that a rules-based proliferation strategy on the part of the United States, while perhaps preferred, does not reflect the reality of other nations proliferation activities.

On the Iranian front, its clear that the purpose behind this media-blitz was to make it harder for China to oppose sanctions for Iran. In light of the June 6th package offered to Iran, this story highlights the US effort to push all P-5 members of the United Nations to get tougher with Iran. For Russia, the answer has been more clear-cut: offer another nuclear package.

On both these issues, the recent Lebanese crisis makes Chinese opposition to US goals considerably more difficult to effectively voice. On the Indian front, its now not only accused of aiding Iran's programs but must deal with heightened evidence of Iran's terrorist connections. The US position of making an exception for India (a recent victim of terrorist attacks), while still going against the global 'norm' of non-proliferation, becomes easier to swallow.

In regards to the Iranian dilemmna, it seems the net-result of the Lebanese crisis is 1) to harden negative views of Israeli actions and 2) diminish the view of Iran as a responsibile nation. As such, Chinese (and Russian) opposition to sanctioning Iran-- or giving full diplomatic pressure to respond to the June 6th deal-- becomes more and more difficult to sustain.

While such a reading may suggest the success of using export controls as political weapons to aid the American counter-proliferation agenda, nationally based (and perhaps selective) enforcement of counter-proliferation laws seems to erode the norm of proliferation. Using these counter-proliferation tools to push for the success of an India deal, seems only to further encourage nuclear competition between the great powers. As such national security agendas may be succeeding on particular points (ensuring regional allies recieve much wanted technology), but failing to stop the main problem: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

General News Sources

"U.S. Freezes Chinese Space Company Assets over Iranian Missile Aid"; Aviation Today
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_defense_story.jsp?id=news/aw062606
p2.xml

"President's Address"; Great Wall China Industry Corporation;
http://www.cgwic.com/about/index.html

"2001 Export Administration Act Passes Senate', Includes Bennett Amendment";
http://www.senate.gov/~bennett/press/record.cfm?id=224892

"US to dangle nuclear deal in exchange for Russia's help on Iran"; Yahoo News
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060709/wl_afp/usrussianuclear_060709201618

"China: US Sanctions Undermine Non-Proliferation Cooperation"; Global Security http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2006/china-060615-voa01.htm

"Washington sanctions on China Fims 'Irresponsible'"; China Daily
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/16/content_618339.htm

"Treasury Designates U.S. and Chinese Companies Supporting Iranian Missile Proliferation"
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js4317.htm

"Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000" (a history of its use); US State Department
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15234.htm

Sources on Export Controls

"2004 Foreign Policy Controls." Bureau of Industry and Security, US Department of Commerce;
https://www.bis.doc.gov/PoliciesAndRegulations/05ForPolControls/Chap1_Intro.htm

RL30169: Export Administration Act of 1979 Reauthorization; CRS Report
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/international/inter-22.cfm

"Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000." (text of law);
http://www.parstimes.com/history/hr1883.html

"Clintion Signs 'Iran Nonproliferation Act' "; Arms Control Today.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_04/irnap00.asp

"The Export Administration Act (S.737 - H.R.4034) " (archival discussion of orginial 1979 act); Heritage Foundation
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/IB43.cfm

"Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note)"; US State Department
http://www.state.gov/t/np/c15237.htm

2006-06-28T13:14:00.001-07:00

Proliferation Press Investigates the Uranium Industry Expansion: More Cancer for the Navajo Nation?

As shocking as it sounds, increase global demand for nuclear reactors (whether to produce power, weapons-grade materials, or both) is shorting up demand for uranium. The result: the revitalization of a once anemic nuclear energy industry.

As Reuters reports, the uranium's spot (cash) price is up 27% since last year. Australia seems to be heaping most of the increased demand: with Uranex NL (an Australian mining company) providing China most sought-after nuclear raw materials. The world of commerce transforms world global security calculus once again!

But there are winners closer at home as well. The Toronto Star points out that a Canadian company will soon be re-opening mines in Colorado. Uranium Corp. will jump-start production at the Colorado Plateau-- which closed in the 1980s owing to weak demand. This also will apparently stretch into Utah as well.

Kathy Helms gives the best description (in the Gallop Independent), and adds another wrinkle into the recent uranium expansion:

The uranium rush is on. The question is, how long will the Navajo Nation's ban on uranium mining last when developers are coming at the Nation from all directions?

International Uranium Corp. announced this week that it is reopening its U.S. uranium/vanadium mines beginning immediately, and will stockpile the ore at its White Mesa mill in Bluff, Utah.

IUC holds conventional mining properties in the Four Corners area, located in three distinct mining districts: the Colorado Plateau, the Henry Mountains and the Arizona Strip. IUC intends to begin mining activities immediately at the Pandora, Topaz, Sunday and St. Jude mines on the Colorado Plateau, followed by two additional mines in 2007.

In searching out for the rationale behind the Navajo Nation's ban on uranium mining, I ran across this on-line forum (brought to us by Democracy Now!) with Navajo President Joe Shirley, Earl Tully of Dine Care (a Navajo environmental organization), and radio correspondent Amy Goodman.

Key highlights of the discussion:

Joe Shirly:

-"...it [uranium mining] has killed many of my medicine people, and because of that, there are some of the ceremonies that they used to know that we don't know anymore. It has killed a lot of elderly. It has killed a lot of young..."

Earl Tully:

-"One of the things here is that I think in many cases race is not the issue, but income. It is -- you know, again I will go back to the average E.P.A. penalties and clean-up by race is very, very different. The people of colors are highly impacted in a sense that they do not receive adequate just compensation as in white communities."
-"As far as the RECA [Radiation Exposure Compensation Act] is concerned, you know, before the amendment was made, $100,000 was considered the adequate, I guess, compensation for a particular person who had filed. And $100,000, you take the average cost of 30% for a lawyer. So the family would only get $70,000. And when you spread that around it's not going to go too far. And I think one of the areas of RECA is to boost that up to $150,000. "

From an article written in 'In Motion Magazine', the Bureau of Navajo Affairs now lists 2,450 Native Americans eligible for Federal funds owing to uranium poisoning. This doesn't include 412 victims who died before funds were made available.

Clearly there are costs to the expanding nuclear industry: whether on the level of global security, or small-scale-- but extremely tragic-- health threats. Such a wide array of issues keeps the nuclear issue not only one of business profits, but inter-governmental conflict: with local, state, federal and even extra-federal US entities all vying to see their viewpoint win out.

The one aspect, most pressing in my view, is whether or not mining methods have been developed that significantly lessen or eliminate threats to workers or near-by inhabitants. This part of the story has been one I've had trouble tracking down-- but I'll hopefully report to you soon on it.

But regardless of the fullness of this particular story, its clear that the faucets of the nuclear issue, whether pertaining to health risks, weaponization concerns, or American race relations, are as numerous as they are contentious. And the future promises only their simultaneous sharpening and proliferation.

2006-06-28T12:13:00.000-07:00

Proliferation Press News Bulletin: Non-Proliferation Experts send Joint Letter to Congress

Below is the text of a letter of proliferation experts, from various non-profit agencies, outlining the case against the US-India Nuclear Deal. It is one of the best (and concise) summaries of what is considered wrong about the N-deal. Furthermore, the names and occupations of its authors are nice markers of organizations involved in non-proliferation policy (for any people who may be looking for internships/jobs or further information).

For the original pdf file or the accompanying appendixes (which are not post here), go to this site.

For any interested proliferation junkies or loyal readers, this letter will be a good foil against a Tellis publication arguing against critics of the nuclear deal (read it here) that I will be reviewing early next week.

June 20, 2006

Dear Member of Congress:

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 5 finally received an answer from the State Department to the Committee's question: Does the proposed US-India nuclear deal violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)? The question arises because the Article I of the NPT prohibits members "in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or othernuclear explosive devices." The NPT defines a non-nuclear weapons state to be any country that did not explode a nuclear device before 1967. This clearly includes India, a state even the Administration has refused to recognize as a weapons state under the NPT. How would U.S. nuclear aid violate the NPT?

Foreign nuclear fuel supplies would free up India's limited domestic nuclear fuel making capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons. By the Indian government's own admission, its military and civil nuclear programs are "inextricably" linked, so if we assist one we assist the other. Since the proposed deal also accepts the legitimacy of India's nuclear weapons program, it would effectively encourage India to continue in that direction. The State Department response predictably claims that the proposed nuclear cooperation arrangement with India would not constitute an NPT violation. But to reach this conclusion the department construes the meaning of the NPT so narrowly as to render it meaningless.

The State Department also ignores the reality that partial safeguards in a state with a secret nuclear weapons program are more symbol than substance. India may not have to comply with the NPT, but the United States, as a signatory to the NPT, has a solemn responsibility not only to discourage proliferation by others, but to refrain from assisting other states' nuclear weapons program in any way. The current proposal would breach this central provision of the treaty.

The administration has tried to downplay these points by emphasizing the strategic advantages of partnership with India. Administration officials contend that failure to accede to India on the nuclear issues would threaten the whole arrangement. Yet, India's Foreign Secretary recently acknowledged that the deal may not get by the Congress and this would not affect closer ties with the United States. The main point is that our strategic interest dictates that we should not discard our nonproliferation policy and our Treaty obligations. To do so would only enfeeble our case against NPT violators.

Thomas Cochran, Director of the Natural Resource Defense Council Nuclear Program Victor Gilinsky, energy consultant, former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner
John Holum, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs
Daryl Kimball, executive director, Arms Control Association
Christopher Paine, senior analyst, Nuclear Program, Natural Resource Defense Council
George Perkovich, Director of the Nonproliferation Program, The Carnegie Endowment Henry S. Rowen, Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; Member, President BushÂs Iraqi WMD Commission, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, President of the RAND Corporation
Lawrence Scheinman, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, former Assistant Directorfor Nonproliferationn, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Henry Sokolski, executive director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Department of Defense
Leonard Weiss, advisor, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, former staff director,U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee*

Any inquiries regarding this letter should be directed to The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 703-271-9852, npec@npec-web.org

2006-06-26T20:17:00.000-07:00

Gordon Brown reaffirms Britain's "Independent Nuclear Deterrent"

It was a small section of Brown's June 22 Madison House speech to Britain's business and industrial leaders, but a significant one sandwiched between a long and tedious proclamation of Labour economic policies from the Prime Minister-to-be:

"And I mean not just stability by securing low inflation but stability in our industrial relations, stability through a stable and competitive tax regime, and stability through a predictable and light touch regulatory environment...the same strength of national purpose we will demonstrate in protecting our security in this Parliament and the long-term - strong in defence in fighting terrorism, upholding NATO, supporting our armed forces at home and abroad, and retaining our independent nuclear deterrent.

In an insecure world we must and will always have the strength to take all necessary long term decisions for stability and security..."

Not a very shocking statement, but one clearly designed to send the message that Labour will replenish the British nuclear deterrent. Such a policy is significant since 1) Britain is a depositary nuclear power-- making all its nuclear decisions significant-- and 2) it reflects the uneasy truth of today's nuclear status. While the total nuclear arsenals are down, nations of all stripes (be they non-nuclear states, minor nuclear states or major nuclear states) are re-priming their deterrents. Such a development in Britain-- considered an example of Kantian, soft-power nation-state-- makes Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (pledging that all member-states will work towards the abolition of nuclear arms) ring hallow.

But the decision follows both political and technical timing. As Martin Walker points out, today's world does not find America nor American allies exceedingly loved (a dull point, but one that I suspect refers to the proliferation of nuclear arms to Iran and North Korea). Furthermore, Britain's nuclear's deterrent is based on Trident submarine missiles that need replacement by 2024. This technological feature is forcing a political decision on Britain's deterrent posture within the next four years. Instead of renouncing an active nuclear deterrent-- moving closer to the nuclear postures Germany and Japan-- Brown's call for a revamped nuclear deterrent expresses political consensus within Britain: with both major political parties in favor of continuing the nation's nuclear deterrent. Labour stood as the lone political force that could dismantle the British nuclear deterrent. Barring a major political shift (a Liberal Democrat in 10 Downing Street), Britain will continue to possess active nuclear deterrent.

Walker views the debate as one between misplaced priorities: with Brown quickly curtailing any hopes by Labour's 'green fringe' to dismantle the British deterrent,

"The would-be disarmers, like Hans Blix and Annan, would be delighted if one of the original five nuclear powers, such as Britain, agreed to give them up. Gordon Brown's wholly gratuitous defense of Britain's nukes should be seen as a pre-emptive strike against them, and against the Greenpeace plan "to spend the $40 billion from the Trident replacement budget like tackling climate change and developing secure alternatives to Middle East oil."

The fact is that Brown, who controls the government purse strings, has virtually doubled the sums for the Atomic Weaponry Establishment at Aldermaston, Britain's nuke factory, over the past two years, from just under $500 million a year to almost $900 million. A new Orion laser system, designed to recreate the temperatures inside the sun or a nuclear explosion, has been built. Hundreds of new nuclear scientists are being hired. Under Blair or Brown, the British are staying in the nuclear business, whether their left wing likes it or not."

While Walker approves of such a decision and considers the economic costs clearly manageable, other do not. Letters to the Times show the fear of a continued and enhanced nuclear deterrent: 1) poorly spent funds, 2) fodder for terrorists, 3) under-cutting counter-proliferation activities and 4) failing to provide 'real' security to Britain. Of these concerns, the last two demand the most attention. But even if these concerns do not outweigh Britain's security needs in favor of nuclear weapons, their purposeful omission from Walker's piece is notable.

While Brown's decision is not surprising (pushing Labour to the 'right' on Security but maintaining social domestic policies is ideal Labour political positioning), Britain's decision-- along with the American decision to revamp its nuclear deterrent, the India-US nuclear deal, and other international developments-- brings into focus a profound failure of the non-proliferation movement. To this day, nations still consider nuclear deterrent essential for security and international prestige. Until this changes (through the actions of nuclear weapon states, following the South African example), there is little hope in deterring new nuclear aspirants.

Britain's decision goes against this dual goal, and highlights (again) the still prominent status of nuclear weapons within international system.

There is also a domestic politics angle to this story: with the announcement of new power plants seen as a critical issue within Scotland's May parliamentary elections. Scotland's current government stands against a new generation of power reactors, seeking instead to favor other, renewable sources (and the industries that support them) for Scotland power needs. Labour, instead, seeks to increase the nuclear aspect to the UK's power portfolio. It seems that Labour is trying to position itself away from 'green' positions, and stake-out a hard-nosed middle ground when it comes to both today's power-needs and security needs. The critical question in this debate is whether or not current nuclear-waste procedures are statisfactory to voters.

What will be interesting-- and I will be sure to track down soon-- is the response from other nations (particularly from non-nuclear weapon states like Germany and Japan (who can easily produce a nuclear deterrent), not to mention Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, how will Britain actually replenish their deterrent? Will there be American help? Will we see an expansion-- both horizontally and vertically-- of the British nuclear deterrent? [To get a better idea of the answer to this question I will also put up links and a brief description of Britain's current nuclear deterrent.]

All these questions assume that opposition within the ranks of Labour do not break this current 'nuclear concensus' among Britain's political establishment. Such an outcome seems unlikely: here I follow the political logic (while certainly not the political ideology) of Fraser Nelson. But the reaction of Britain's 'post-materialist' interest-groups is important, if only to find out where this issue ranks within the mind of the progressive, British voter.

2006-06-26T13:09:00.000-07:00

The US-India Nuclear Deal: Reactions to the Congressional Debate

Three of today's articles go a long way in showing the the global impact the proposed US-India Nuclear Deal. But first some condensed background.

Last summer President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a strategic partnership: of which a cornerstone proposal for nuclear technology sharing has become the focus of debate within Congress.

India, a non-member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been offered by the Bush White House nuclear technology. To some this flies in the face of US obligations to the treaty: as one of the depository powers, America has pledged not to aid in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now, technically the nuclear technology (fuel mainly and parts for plants) are not weapons-- fulfilling another part of the NPT which pledges to share peaceful nuclear technology with non-nuclear member-states. But there are three problems: 1) India is getting preferential treatment over actual members of the NPT and 2) the technology the US is offering holds dual-use (can be used for both 'peaceful' and 'nonpeaceful' uses) possibilities and 3) no inspection procedure to avoid abuse by the Indian side. In fact, half of India's nuclear facilities will not be inspected at all (by the IAEA) under the current proposal.

These problems make many opponents of the deal fear that it will tip off an Asian arms-race, one which Pakistan, China and Japan may all fall into: increasing instability in the region.

Proponents consider the deal accepting 'nuclear' realities. While India is not a member of the NPT, it has nuclear weapons and is considered a responsible nation. To continue to isolate India from the world-system ignores a serious proliferation problem and only adds instability. Furthermore, for Americans this deal holds the hope of making India a US-allied counter-weight to growing Chinese power.

Right now these arguments are being head on Capitol Hill, where it seems likely the treaty will pass but with what amendments is yet to be seen.

The Boston Globe has a very good article that assesses the plan and better yet offers a constructive way towards resolving tensions within the bill. Instead of making the traditional calls for India to become a member of both the NPT and Nuclear Test-Ban treaty, the paper calls for incentives: linking the actual nuclear goods to good behavior. Such an approach seems to cut a nice middle ground: but it still doesn't resolve the main concern of opponents. What happens to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the NPT when a nuclear-recognized nation gets all the positivies without the same obligations as the vast majority of states. The solution also does not guarantee that India won't still violate the incentive system, but by that point have the technological know-how and materials to need not further assistance.

From the other end, this The Indian Express article does a good job of showing the extreme disregard of these concerns by many Indians. Instead of focusing on the deal's potenial impact on the global non-proliferation regime, it bemoans the non-binding language that may be inserted into it (dealing with 'tangental' items like Iran and Nonproliferation treaties). The article makes clear the Indian viewpoint of the N-deal: it signifies their status as a great power. Furthermore, the article shows how deal-proponents flip the logic of opponents: arguing that because India was never a part of the NPT, has been a responsible nuclear-weapons nation for 8 years, stands as a relatively stable democractic state, and is developing into one of the world's most powerful states it unfair that they be held to standards not designed for them (like the Test Ban Treaty or NPT). Like the naval treaties of the Interwar years, this is about national pride and the need for the international system to adjust to the new structural realities of the post-Cold War system.

But aside from the Congressional debate and its interesting description in the Indian Press, the most important note that both articles make is the next step (assuming the Treaty passes Congress): approval from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This group must approve all nuclear transfers and runs by consensus. Will all participating nations-- particularly China and Russia-- agree to a deal that advances US strategic interests without something in return? (China is already building reactors in Pakistan.) But even more important than the deals that will have to be cut internationally, is the central question of security: will this deal, and its indirect effects, add or diminish security among both superpowers and competing regional powers, India and Pakistan in particular?