< urlset xmlns="http://www.google.com/schemas/sitemap/0.84"> < url> < loc>http://www.proliferationpress.blogspot.com/ < lastmod>2006-11-29 < changefreq>hourly < priority>0.8

Proliferation Press

Monday, June 26, 2006

The US-India Nuclear Deal: Reactions to the Congressional Debate

Three of today's articles go a long way in showing the the global impact the proposed US-India Nuclear Deal. But first some condensed background.

Last summer President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a strategic partnership: of which a cornerstone proposal for nuclear technology sharing has become the focus of debate within Congress.

India, a non-member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been offered by the Bush White House nuclear technology. To some this flies in the face of US obligations to the treaty: as one of the depository powers, America has pledged not to aid in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now, technically the nuclear technology (fuel mainly and parts for plants) are not weapons-- fulfilling another part of the NPT which pledges to share peaceful nuclear technology with non-nuclear member-states. But there are three problems: 1) India is getting preferential treatment over actual members of the NPT and 2) the technology the US is offering holds dual-use (can be used for both 'peaceful' and 'nonpeaceful' uses) possibilities and 3) no inspection procedure to avoid abuse by the Indian side. In fact, half of India's nuclear facilities will not be inspected at all (by the IAEA) under the current proposal.

These problems make many opponents of the deal fear that it will tip off an Asian arms-race, one which Pakistan, China and Japan may all fall into: increasing instability in the region.

Proponents consider the deal accepting 'nuclear' realities. While India is not a member of the NPT, it has nuclear weapons and is considered a responsible nation. To continue to isolate India from the world-system ignores a serious proliferation problem and only adds instability. Furthermore, for Americans this deal holds the hope of making India a US-allied counter-weight to growing Chinese power.

Right now these arguments are being head on Capitol Hill, where it seems likely the treaty will pass but with what amendments is yet to be seen.

The Boston Globe has a very good article that assesses the plan and better yet offers a constructive way towards resolving tensions within the bill. Instead of making the traditional calls for India to become a member of both the NPT and Nuclear Test-Ban treaty, the paper calls for incentives: linking the actual nuclear goods to good behavior. Such an approach seems to cut a nice middle ground: but it still doesn't resolve the main concern of opponents. What happens to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the NPT when a nuclear-recognized nation gets all the positivies without the same obligations as the vast majority of states. The solution also does not guarantee that India won't still violate the incentive system, but by that point have the technological know-how and materials to need not further assistance.

From the other end, this The Indian Express article does a good job of showing the extreme disregard of these concerns by many Indians. Instead of focusing on the deal's potenial impact on the global non-proliferation regime, it bemoans the non-binding language that may be inserted into it (dealing with 'tangental' items like Iran and Nonproliferation treaties). The article makes clear the Indian viewpoint of the N-deal: it signifies their status as a great power. Furthermore, the article shows how deal-proponents flip the logic of opponents: arguing that because India was never a part of the NPT, has been a responsible nuclear-weapons nation for 8 years, stands as a relatively stable democractic state, and is developing into one of the world's most powerful states it unfair that they be held to standards not designed for them (like the Test Ban Treaty or NPT). Like the naval treaties of the Interwar years, this is about national pride and the need for the international system to adjust to the new structural realities of the post-Cold War system.

But aside from the Congressional debate and its interesting description in the Indian Press, the most important note that both articles make is the next step (assuming the Treaty passes Congress): approval from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This group must approve all nuclear transfers and runs by consensus. Will all participating nations-- particularly China and Russia-- agree to a deal that advances US strategic interests without something in return? (China is already building reactors in Pakistan.) But even more important than the deals that will have to be cut internationally, is the central question of security: will this deal, and its indirect effects, add or diminish security among both superpowers and competing regional powers, India and Pakistan in particular?

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

<< Home