Gordon Brown reaffirms Britain's "Independent Nuclear Deterrent"

It was a small section of Brown's June 22 Madison House speech to Britain's business and industrial leaders, but a significant one sandwiched between a long and tedious proclamation of Labour economic policies from the Prime Minister-to-be:

"And I mean not just stability by securing low inflation but stability in our industrial relations, stability through a stable and competitive tax regime, and stability through a predictable and light touch regulatory environment...the same strength of national purpose we will demonstrate in protecting our security in this Parliament and the long-term - strong in defence in fighting terrorism, upholding NATO, supporting our armed forces at home and abroad, and retaining our independent nuclear deterrent.

In an insecure world we must and will always have the strength to take all necessary long term decisions for stability and security..."

Not a very shocking statement, but one clearly designed to send the message that Labour will replenish the British nuclear deterrent. Such a policy is significant since 1) Britain is a depositary nuclear power-- making all its nuclear decisions significant-- and 2) it reflects the uneasy truth of today's nuclear status. While the total nuclear arsenals are down, nations of all stripes (be they non-nuclear states, minor nuclear states or major nuclear states) are re-priming their deterrents. Such a development in Britain-- considered an example of Kantian, soft-power nation-state-- makes Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (pledging that all member-states will work towards the abolition of nuclear arms) ring hallow.

But the decision follows both political and technical timing. As Martin Walker points out, today's world does not find America nor American allies exceedingly loved (a dull point, but one that I suspect refers to the proliferation of nuclear arms to Iran and North Korea). Furthermore, Britain's nuclear's deterrent is based on Trident submarine missiles that need replacement by 2024. This technological feature is forcing a political decision on Britain's deterrent posture within the next four years. Instead of renouncing an active nuclear deterrent-- moving closer to the nuclear postures Germany and Japan-- Brown's call for a revamped nuclear deterrent expresses political consensus within Britain: with both major political parties in favor of continuing the nation's nuclear deterrent. Labour stood as the lone political force that could dismantle the British nuclear deterrent. Barring a major political shift (a Liberal Democrat in 10 Downing Street), Britain will continue to possess active nuclear deterrent.

Walker views the debate as one between misplaced priorities: with Brown quickly curtailing any hopes by Labour's 'green fringe' to dismantle the British deterrent,

"The would-be disarmers, like Hans Blix and Annan, would be delighted if one of the original five nuclear powers, such as Britain, agreed to give them up. Gordon Brown's wholly gratuitous defense of Britain's nukes should be seen as a pre-emptive strike against them, and against the Greenpeace plan "to spend the $40 billion from the Trident replacement budget like tackling climate change and developing secure alternatives to Middle East oil."

The fact is that Brown, who controls the government purse strings, has virtually doubled the sums for the Atomic Weaponry Establishment at Aldermaston, Britain's nuke factory, over the past two years, from just under $500 million a year to almost $900 million. A new Orion laser system, designed to recreate the temperatures inside the sun or a nuclear explosion, has been built. Hundreds of new nuclear scientists are being hired. Under Blair or Brown, the British are staying in the nuclear business, whether their left wing likes it or not."

While Walker approves of such a decision and considers the economic costs clearly manageable, other do not. Letters to the Times show the fear of a continued and enhanced nuclear deterrent: 1) poorly spent funds, 2) fodder for terrorists, 3) under-cutting counter-proliferation activities and 4) failing to provide 'real' security to Britain. Of these concerns, the last two demand the most attention. But even if these concerns do not outweigh Britain's security needs in favor of nuclear weapons, their purposeful omission from Walker's piece is notable.

While Brown's decision is not surprising (pushing Labour to the 'right' on Security but maintaining social domestic policies is ideal Labour political positioning), Britain's decision-- along with the American decision to revamp its nuclear deterrent, the India-US nuclear deal, and other international developments-- brings into focus a profound failure of the non-proliferation movement. To this day, nations still consider nuclear deterrent essential for security and international prestige. Until this changes (through the actions of nuclear weapon states, following the South African example), there is little hope in deterring new nuclear aspirants.

Britain's decision goes against this dual goal, and highlights (again) the still prominent status of nuclear weapons within international system.

There is also a domestic politics angle to this story: with the announcement of new power plants seen as a critical issue within Scotland's May parliamentary elections. Scotland's current government stands against a new generation of power reactors, seeking instead to favor other, renewable sources (and the industries that support them) for Scotland power needs. Labour, instead, seeks to increase the nuclear aspect to the UK's power portfolio. It seems that Labour is trying to position itself away from 'green' positions, and stake-out a hard-nosed middle ground when it comes to both today's power-needs and security needs. The critical question in this debate is whether or not current nuclear-waste procedures are statisfactory to voters.

What will be interesting-- and I will be sure to track down soon-- is the response from other nations (particularly from non-nuclear weapon states like Germany and Japan (who can easily produce a nuclear deterrent), not to mention Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, how will Britain actually replenish their deterrent? Will there be American help? Will we see an expansion-- both horizontally and vertically-- of the British nuclear deterrent? [To get a better idea of the answer to this question I will also put up links and a brief description of Britain's current nuclear deterrent.]

All these questions assume that opposition within the ranks of Labour do not break this current 'nuclear concensus' among Britain's political establishment. Such an outcome seems unlikely: here I follow the political logic (while certainly not the political ideology) of Fraser Nelson. But the reaction of Britain's 'post-materialist' interest-groups is important, if only to find out where this issue ranks within the mind of the progressive, British voter.