Proliferation Press News Bulletin: Non-Proliferation Experts send Joint Letter to Congress
Below is the text of a letter of proliferation experts, from various non-profit agencies, outlining the case against the US-India Nuclear Deal. It is one of the best (and concise) summaries of what is considered wrong about the N-deal. Furthermore, the names and occupations of its authors are nice markers of organizations involved in non-proliferation policy (for any people who may be looking for internships/jobs or further information).
For the original pdf file or the accompanying appendixes (which are not post here), go to this site.
For any interested proliferation junkies or loyal readers, this letter will be a good foil against a Tellis publication arguing against critics of the nuclear deal (read it here) that I will be reviewing early next week.
June 20, 2006
Dear Member of Congress:
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 5 finally received an answer from the State Department to the Committee's question: Does the proposed US-India nuclear deal violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)? The question arises because the Article I of the NPT prohibits members "in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or othernuclear explosive devices." The NPT defines a non-nuclear weapons state to be any country that did not explode a nuclear device before 1967. This clearly includes India, a state even the Administration has refused to recognize as a weapons state under the NPT. How would U.S. nuclear aid violate the NPT?
Foreign nuclear fuel supplies would free up India's limited domestic nuclear fuel making capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons. By the Indian government's own admission, its military and civil nuclear programs are "inextricably" linked, so if we assist one we assist the other. Since the proposed deal also accepts the legitimacy of India's nuclear weapons program, it would effectively encourage India to continue in that direction. The State Department response predictably claims that the proposed nuclear cooperation arrangement with India would not constitute an NPT violation. But to reach this conclusion the department construes the meaning of the NPT so narrowly as to render it meaningless.
The State Department also ignores the reality that partial safeguards in a state with a secret nuclear weapons program are more symbol than substance. India may not have to comply with the NPT, but the United States, as a signatory to the NPT, has a solemn responsibility not only to discourage proliferation by others, but to refrain from assisting other states' nuclear weapons program in any way. The current proposal would breach this central provision of the treaty.
The administration has tried to downplay these points by emphasizing the strategic advantages of partnership with India. Administration officials contend that failure to accede to India on the nuclear issues would threaten the whole arrangement. Yet, India's Foreign Secretary recently acknowledged that the deal may not get by the Congress and this would not affect closer ties with the United States. The main point is that our strategic interest dictates that we should not discard our nonproliferation policy and our Treaty obligations. To do so would only enfeeble our case against NPT violators.
Thomas Cochran, Director of the Natural Resource Defense Council Nuclear Program Victor Gilinsky, energy consultant, former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner
John Holum, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs
Daryl Kimball, executive director, Arms Control Association
Christopher Paine, senior analyst, Nuclear Program, Natural Resource Defense Council
George Perkovich, Director of the Nonproliferation Program, The Carnegie Endowment Henry S. Rowen, Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; Member, President BushÂs Iraqi WMD Commission, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, President of the RAND Corporation
Lawrence Scheinman, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, former Assistant Directorfor Nonproliferationn, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Henry Sokolski, executive director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Department of Defense
Leonard Weiss, advisor, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, former staff director,U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee*
Any inquiries regarding this letter should be directed to The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 703-271-9852, npec@npec-web.org
Below is the text of a letter of proliferation experts, from various non-profit agencies, outlining the case against the US-India Nuclear Deal. It is one of the best (and concise) summaries of what is considered wrong about the N-deal. Furthermore, the names and occupations of its authors are nice markers of organizations involved in non-proliferation policy (for any people who may be looking for internships/jobs or further information).
For the original pdf file or the accompanying appendixes (which are not post here), go to this site.
For any interested proliferation junkies or loyal readers, this letter will be a good foil against a Tellis publication arguing against critics of the nuclear deal (read it here) that I will be reviewing early next week.
June 20, 2006
Dear Member of Congress:
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 5 finally received an answer from the State Department to the Committee's question: Does the proposed US-India nuclear deal violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)? The question arises because the Article I of the NPT prohibits members "in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or othernuclear explosive devices." The NPT defines a non-nuclear weapons state to be any country that did not explode a nuclear device before 1967. This clearly includes India, a state even the Administration has refused to recognize as a weapons state under the NPT. How would U.S. nuclear aid violate the NPT?
Foreign nuclear fuel supplies would free up India's limited domestic nuclear fuel making capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons. By the Indian government's own admission, its military and civil nuclear programs are "inextricably" linked, so if we assist one we assist the other. Since the proposed deal also accepts the legitimacy of India's nuclear weapons program, it would effectively encourage India to continue in that direction. The State Department response predictably claims that the proposed nuclear cooperation arrangement with India would not constitute an NPT violation. But to reach this conclusion the department construes the meaning of the NPT so narrowly as to render it meaningless.
The State Department also ignores the reality that partial safeguards in a state with a secret nuclear weapons program are more symbol than substance. India may not have to comply with the NPT, but the United States, as a signatory to the NPT, has a solemn responsibility not only to discourage proliferation by others, but to refrain from assisting other states' nuclear weapons program in any way. The current proposal would breach this central provision of the treaty.
The administration has tried to downplay these points by emphasizing the strategic advantages of partnership with India. Administration officials contend that failure to accede to India on the nuclear issues would threaten the whole arrangement. Yet, India's Foreign Secretary recently acknowledged that the deal may not get by the Congress and this would not affect closer ties with the United States. The main point is that our strategic interest dictates that we should not discard our nonproliferation policy and our Treaty obligations. To do so would only enfeeble our case against NPT violators.
Thomas Cochran, Director of the Natural Resource Defense Council Nuclear Program Victor Gilinsky, energy consultant, former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner
John Holum, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs
Daryl Kimball, executive director, Arms Control Association
Christopher Paine, senior analyst, Nuclear Program, Natural Resource Defense Council
George Perkovich, Director of the Nonproliferation Program, The Carnegie Endowment Henry S. Rowen, Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; Member, President BushÂs Iraqi WMD Commission, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, President of the RAND Corporation
Lawrence Scheinman, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, former Assistant Directorfor Nonproliferationn, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Henry Sokolski, executive director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Department of Defense
Leonard Weiss, advisor, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, former staff director,U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee*
Any inquiries regarding this letter should be directed to The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 703-271-9852, npec@npec-web.org
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