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Proliferation Press

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Australia's Future as 'Energy Superpower'?


A Glimpse into the New World of Counter-Proliferation


The Daily Telegraph reported yesterday on Austrailan Prime Minister Howard's speech to theCommittee for Economic Development of Australia. Of his lengthy address, one line has gotten the attention of many foreign relations observers-- not to mention his own constituents and political rivals):


"With the right policies, we have the makings of an energy superpower." Austraila a superpower? How can this be.

Austraila's Uranium

Austraila holds 30% of the world's low-cost uranium (map). While the industry shut down in the 1971 had come to a complete stand-still, new times bring with them new demand. With a surging demand for long-term power solutions and weapons news, Austraila has found itself as the last great, stable area for uranium exploration. Such a demand is leading to strange bed-fellows: China and Austrailia recently concluded a uranium deal. Guess 'Clash of Civilizations' is out, 'Energy Compatriots' is in:

"Australia's energy exports are forecast to grow to around $45 billion in 2006-07, more than three times what we earned last year from meat, grains and wool combined...Australia can, and should, supply the domestic and world economies with low-cost energy."

Domestic Opposition

Howard's comments have both an international and domestic aim. On the domestic front, Howard boasts the best electoral record of any Aussie politican: being elected in 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2004. Most speculation on Howard today revolves around when he will leave, but it is clear that Howard is not done pushing his image of Austrailia in regards to dometic power needs or Austrailia position in the international system. On the first front, it is interesting to note Austrailia, standing only with the United States, rejection of the Kyoto Protocol.

Critics charge that such pro-petrol policies have put Austrailia in sorry state in terms of long-term energy needs. Yet, Howard has answered this call: with nuclear power.

Such a stance is controversial in Austrailia: there is considerable support for more 'green' solutions, and still concern about the dangers of using nuclear power. But it is clear that Howard, like Bush, is pushing for nuclear power. And while some may claim such a policy keeps Austrailia away from lucrative, long-term investment in renewable energies, it comes with one large attraction: transforming Austrailia into world's first uranium-driven superpower.

Austrailia on the World Stage: Can it Fit into the America's Grand Vision of Counter-Proliferation

Pushing uranium is geo-political boast to Austrailia. Becoming the central pub to the world's growing appetite for nuclear materials spells success not only for the Austrailian economy but also its international prestige. Yet, would such a shift be welcomed by the international community?

President Bush is often assailed by critics as eroding the norm of counter-proliferation through revamped nuclear armament plans, special nuclear deals and disregard for international agreements. To counter this image of 'selective standards', the Bush administration has made early steps with Russia to make a 'rules based' system for nuclear power. At the recent G-8 meeting, upon announcing their own nuclear cooperation deal, Bush and Putin announced their goal of providing all nations the ability to obtain nuclear energy.

Such a plan seeks to control nuclear proliferation not by controlling the raw resource (uranium or plotunium) but rather its enrichment. The plans allows nations to get their uranium enriched in another country, then have it used for their respective power needs, with reminder supplies being returned back to the site of enrichment. Such a plan keeps the main ingredient of weapons --excess highly enriched uranium-- out of the hands of non-enriching nations. Such a plan finds its roots in a past proposal to solve the Iranian nuclear stand-off: have Russia provide Iran with nuclear fuel and then having the used materials returned, ensuring that enriched uranium could not be used to construct weapons. In short the rule would be as follows: nuclear power 'yes', 'no' to uranium enrichment.


While on face this plan may seem to solve some problems, it isn't really different from the 'legalistic fiction' of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: all nations with legal enrichment facilities continue to monopolize it, while getting to choose who or who not to give materials too. Furthermore the new framework (by going away from the NPT) seems to open the way for all depository members (those nations with 'legal' nuclear weapons) to caste away any fidelity to the long-term goal of nuclear weapon abolition-- a central principle of the NPT.


But what dose Austrailia have to do with this plan? Austrailia's PM Howard is pushing the
envelop on this putative plan: hinting at Austrailia's desire to be added to the 'enricher' list. The addition of a staunch US ally makes attempts to codify the new norm of 'non-enrichment' exceedingly difficult. But it doesn't seem the United States can refuse: 1) it risks losing the most important uranium supplier of the centry and 2) it must face up to its own India precedent of 'trustworthy' nations getting special treatment. It would be hard for most members of the international community to consider Austrailia not 'trustworthy' enough to possess its own enrichment capability while green-lighting India. As such, Austrailia's addition would promise only further deadlock on the Iranian front. How can the United States drum up support to bar Iran from enrichment activities when it bends rules for its Aussie ally?

The New World: The Race for Energy Partnerships & Proliferation Solutions

So it seems the world system has fully entered a new stage: the race for nuclear energy. Such a development is understandable given dwindling oil supplies, yet it comes with a large risk: the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is still room for a norm reserval: in Austrailia the Labor could take over and push Austrailia off the path of energy super-power, being statisfied with clean energy and middle power status. On the American front, a new administration could revitalize the once strong and bi-partisan counter-proliferation voting bloc. Yet it seems both outcomes are unlikely. Will voters really support policies that diminish their nations' prestige and power in the age of terrorism? Can politicans really win on the 'detente' principle that safety depends on mutual danger? Unlikey.

But neither the extreme (the norm of counter-proliferation or extreme-proliferation) shows reality for policymakers today: in the middle is the nebulous ground of WDM proliferation management.
How that middle ground will be shaped is of critical importance to our security. Below is the growing list of nuclear partnerships:

-Turkey-Russia

-China-Pakistan

-US-India

-France-India; (historical link)

-Russia-US


But such a growing list can be turned into a strong counter-proilferation wave: with a strong, international inspections regime by the IAEA. Having a robust, international inspection regime can allow nations to achieve their power needs but curtail dangerous weapons proliferation (and with Iraq, has been shown to partially succeed). Yet, before such a plan can be actualized, a clear notion of what benefits non-proliferators (whether they be satisfied states or revisionist) get from abstaining from abstaining. If they recieve no tangible benefit and watch other powers develop 'nuclear primacy', such a plan is doomed to failure. Yet if their is mutual sacriface on the part of major powers, concensus can be found to stop new proliferators.

Such an outcome is perhaps the hardest. Many proliferation analysts (and watchers like myself) feel that the best time to curb nuclear proliferation-- expressed by the Achaeson-Lilianthal Plan-- has long since passed. And attempts at internationally monitoring would have to buck a poor historical record. But it seems with the new dynamics of energy, freezing nuclear technology is impossible.


But management is still possible. But its come by making the right deicisions: whether it be in how we deal with an aging population of nuclear warheads, follow current treaties, seek to construct a meaningful inspection regime, or make effective nuclear deals with countries. Austrailia's role has yet to be defined. Furthermore, the plans for freezing enrichment nations has brought agreement between the US and Russia, two of the three heavyweights (add China) when it comes to international proliferation policy. One must closely watch the reaction to this proposal and see how it develops. One thing is clear: new solutions are needed. But any solution needs the right details (for example an inspection regime and clear pathyway to sanctions for violating countries) if it is to work.

References

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4731244.stm http://indiaenews.com/2006-07/15336-french-scientist-advices-caution-indias-n-programme.htm http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/15/AR2006071500398.html http://www.sea-us.org.au/uran-res.html

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19835472-12250,00.html

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0606/S00548.htm

http://www.news.com.au/dailytelegraph/story/0,22049,19828072-5001024,00.html

http://www.sea-us.org.au/overview.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acheson-Lilienthal_Report

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