“WWII Is Over”; And So Should U.S. Hopes for Japanese Nukes: Responding to the Latest Neo-Con Insight of Charles Krauthammer

Charles Krauthammer, the consummate neo-con pundit provocateur, writes a beautifully crafted, but logically murky Friday op-ed in last week’s Washington Post.

The argument? A little foggy.

But one thing’s clear: Krauthammer’s murky call for Japanese high-stakes, quasi nuclear-brinkmanship against China not only stands as one of his less articulate op-eds, but perhaps his most dangerous.

But, first: What is Krauthammer saying? I offer two possibilities:

Option A: Japan Should Go Nuclear

“The American reaction to such talk is knee-jerk opposition. Like those imperial Japanese soldiers discovered holed up on some godforsaken Pacific island decades after World War II, we continue to act as if we, too, never received news of the Japanese surrender. We applaud the Japanese for continuing their adherence to the MacArthur constitution that forever denies Japan the status of Great Power replete with commensurate military force.”

Option B: A Japanese Threat of Nuclear Weaponization Would Compel China to Put the Pressure on North Korea

“Japan's threatening to go nuclear would alter that calculation. It might even persuade China to squeeze Kim Jong Il as a way to prevent Japan from going nuclear. The Japan card remains the only one that carries even the remote possibility of reversing North Korea's nuclear program.”

Krauthammer rarely dishes up such muddled reasoning. But, putting on my best George Bailey impersonation, I licensed Krauthammer the following hybrid thesis:

Japan has every right to go nuclear; and if Japan threatened such an action, China would be spurred into better containing North Korea’s nuclear threat—which would then eliminate the actual need of Japanese nuclear weaponization (not that there’s anything wrong with that).

Whoa—Krauthammer. What’s up with the 2004 Kerry-esque incoherence?

Just call it what it is: a nuclear-charged, diplomatic gambit.

Oh, because then everyone reading it would rapidly turn the page.

Would China’s reaction be that restrained? And is a Japanese threat of nuclear weapons really so inconsequential to other world players?

So, with this in mind, let’s consider the risks a Krauthammer’s Nuclear Japan Strategy may pose.

Risk #1: China, fearing further US-Japanese aggression, seeks to modernize its nuclear deterrent and embraces North Korea as its most reliable (if annoying) friend in the region.

Risk #2: Japan threatening to build nuclear weapons would really kill the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Note #1: Krauthammer evokes the “fact” that all great powers have gone nuclear decades ago. Here he forgets about Germany.

Japan and Germany are critical to maintaining the NPT: A document that seeks to, however imperfectly, 1) limit the desire of states for nuclear weapons and 2) build international support for counter-proliferation.

Risk #3: America, again, looks like a hypocrite. Except this time it looses any international support for its counter-proliferation stance towards Iran.

Note #2: America continuously argues that Iran and North Korea, by virtue of their signatures of the NPT, must continue to renounce nuclear weapons. Yet, if America encourages (a loyal ally) Japan to junk the treaty, how can America have any authority to tell other nations they do not have the right to go nuclear.

And don’t forget, the U.S. already was pushing its luck with the India nuclear deal.

Krauthammer would no doubt evoke the need for “case by case”, not “rule-based” nuclear diplomacy. And, in doing so, would point to Japan’s stable, status-quo, democratic government as earning it the right to go nuclear. But any bright lines distinctions would be turned to mush the next day.

Why?

Because, as Krauthammer concedes, this is about American interests first and foremost—not the concerns of counter-proliferation or diplomatic consistency.

If Krauthammer can see this, I think the rest of the international community can as well.

But such concerns are those of weak-kneed, appeasing, and amoral internationalists.

Unfortunately these concerns come with hard-elbowed, firm, and moral consequences. But, in Krauthammer’s defense, neo-cons have come to admit their weakness at consequence comprehension.