US-India Nuclear Deal Roundup:
The Final 'Press' Blitz of the US-India Nuclear Deal in the US House of Representatives; A Defense of ElBaradei; India's Reaction

Today and tomorrow will witness two key votes that change current US laws on the shipment of nuclear materials to India. The removal of these obstacles then allows US-India nuclear cooperation to commence.

As numerous news-sources show, yesterday and today are showing signs of one last push of N-deal opponents to influence the vote in House.

The central figure in this press blitz is Representative Edward Markey (D-MA). This is not surprising as is co-founder of the Congressional Bipartisan Taskforce on Nonproliferation.

Markey, along with Reps. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) of the Armed Services Committee and Barbara Lee (D-CA) of the International Relations Committee, sent a letter to Condoleezza Rice demanding the prompt release of a semi-annual report on all persons or companies engaged in illicit proliferation activities (for an example refer back to this earlier blog entry).

Knowing that such a report would no doubt have Indian persons and companies on it, these Representatives are hoping to use this demand to win some votes against the nuclear deal. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that either the report will be released or the vote will go the way its critics would desire.

The request did provide fodder for some editorials: the San Diego Daily Transcript and the San Francisco Chronicle. While the keyword "India" is the most searched item within the New York Time's search engine, there is no recent editorial devoted to the subject or the upcoming Congressional vote.

Looking to the State Department website, one finds that the administration had an easy way out of Markey's attempt at a news-cycle stunt: talk about everything else. Even with today' s admission that the administration knew of and suppressed knowledge of Pakistani plans for a new plutonium enrichment center (with the express purpose of enlarging their nuclear weapons capability), the news from Lebanon and Iraq is drowning out any prolonged focus on this news-item. Between Bush's meeting with the Iraqi Prime Minister and Rice's meeting with the Lebanese President, there is little space for major news outlets to devote to this story.

But the India-US deal has yet to clear every hurdle.

The Senate will not vote on the deal until after its summer recess, giving time for opponents to more effectively use the recent disclosure of the Pakistani plant and any upcoming State Department Report to either pick off supporters or add amendments.

In fact, it seems that the amendment route is the way-- along with stepping up pressure on international organizations-- for opponents to most effectively diminish the deal's enactment.

India's Demand for 'Strings Free' Deal

Kay Benedict, a reporter for the Indian 'Daily News Analysis', points out domestic opposition to the legislative package in India. For details on domestic opposition to aspects of the US legislation refer to this past blog. Central to this discussion is the direct opposition now lodged against the deal by CPI.

Such a development shows the formation of an anti-Congress party bloc (India's ruling coalition) to the nuclear deal. Prakash Karat, General Secretary for CPI, calls the deal a 'trap' and brings up nine points of concern. At the center of all these concerns are perceived attempts by Washington to limit India's independent ability to pursue its nuclear policy-- both in regards to energy and weapons.

The tough road for Indian support for nuclear deal must be included in American attempts to bloc the deal. Opponents have found it much easier to give fodder to Indian nationalists against the deal than changing the votes of their fellow representatives. Much of this owes to the different priorities of each country: for India this deal is top-news, whereas in the United States there is small time to make this a central issue on which to campaign for or against.

Thus one finds that opponents are not so much trying to defeat the bill as make it unpalatable to India. Further, cautious supporters are ensuring that if India acts against US proliferation interested that there is ample space for an American reaction. For both groups, the status of the 'deal' as merely a law revision as opposed to a 'treaty' has played an integral part in the debate. While such a strategy both downplayed the act to the public and helped bring smooth sailing in US Congress, but it has brought ill-effects as well for the Bush administration's goals.

First, this non-treaty status has made it easy for opponents to demand that the Indian waiver on US laws nuclear export laws be temporary and not permanent: making it the President's decision whether or not to continue uranium transfers. As such, any moment in which India is seen as a 'irresponsible' nuclear power (a nuclear testing, large development of weapons, etc.), anti-deal legislators will be able to pressure the President into revoking the deal. Given Bush's weak approval ratings and the fact that a proliferatoring India would grab headlines, it seems this backdoor approach is the most likely to succeed.

Further it has allowed non-binding and language amendments to be added to the deal. While these are not of critical importance within the United States (where the Bush administration will be its own legal interpretor), in India these changes have caused huge problems in drumming up domestic support for the deal. Non-biding amendments such as encouraging India to favor the US position on Iran or join the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty have been deal-breakers to many opponents in India.

Indian Strategy: Unanimous Resolution

The solution for Indian critics is to have a unanimous resolution passed on the parameters of the nuclear deal. By Paraliament passing a unamious resolution (specifically excluding some parts of the US legislation), it is hoped that India will get the deal without the coniditions.

As Express News Service points out, such a strategy made it easier for the past Indian Prime Minister to resist calls from Bush to send troops to Iraq. When Bush made a request, the PM would point out that his entire Paraliament passed a motion to the contrary-- effectively setting policy for him.

But Indian troops in Iraq and nuclear transactions are very seperate ends. It will be interesting such a development could send to Senators after the summer recess.

Putting Pressure on the IAEA

Also today was harsh critique of El Baradei's support for the India Nuclear Deal by a group of proliferation experts (letter has yet to be tracked down). Such a piece reflects the transitional role Baradei (rightly) is guiding the IAEA. While some may say its inconsistent for the IAEA to support the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it chief duty is to ensure a transparent and safe nuclear environment: both goals that cannot be met if its divorces itself from American interests, completely.

Yet, what is interesting about the critique is that it judges before the verdict is in. ElBaradei has yet to have his voice heard fully on the details of the inspection regime India will receive. While currently the US-India deal calls for only 'non-military' Indian installations to be monitored, how this is enacted has yet to be seen.

Whether the India passed Congress or India is not the key step to focus on. The real 'prime time' event will be the long and detail orientated discussion among the NSG and IAEA. It is this step that will provide the evidence for cursing or crediting ElBaradei.

So before those are too critical on ElBaradei, perhaps they should first step back and realize he is maximizing the likelihood that this deal will not cause destabilize proliferation. To do so he is open to charges of inconsistency, but he is guaranteeing an increased (not silenced) voice for the IAEA in the future. That is something 1) to cheer and 2) incredibly difficult to achieve.