< urlset xmlns="http://www.google.com/schemas/sitemap/0.84"> < url> < loc>http://www.proliferationpress.blogspot.com/ < lastmod>2006-11-29 < changefreq>hourly < priority>0.8

Proliferation Press

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

The Topsy-Turvey Path to Approval: US Congress and the India Nuclear Deal

As reported in the Indian Tribune, Senator Lugar has confirmed that a final vote on the US-India Nuclear Deal ( a legalistic bundle of exemptions to certain nuclear-commerce laws for India along with conditions) will not be voted on before the Congressional summer recess, which begins August 4th. Lugar made these comments to reporters after a speech to the US India Friendship Council, a interest group for the US Indian community.

There have been numerous reactions to this announcement, reflecting vastly divergent viewpoints on the legislation now awaiting floor votes in Congress.

The US State Department, in a recent Press Release, makes light of the delay. The article states that US Senators "praise" the India deal, while making no mention of the announcement that more time would be needed before a final vote. (For those of you interested, here is a transcript of a recent speech by Condoleezza Rice to the group).

No where mentioned is the following statement by Lugar in regards to the proposed legislation (which was also made to reporters after his speech):

"Now there are some in our state Department, there are some in the Indian Foreign Office who say, "listen, those Senators, those members of the House changed the language here a little bit. This is not exactly what we signed on to. What about this little addition here and that one there?"
... This is the deliberative process...I believe the changes are constructive; but even if they are controversial, I am hopeful that statesmen on both sides, India and the United States, will not be so adamant that somehow or other this is delayed."

These "little" changes are making big ripples. From India, we have S Ragotham (in his article Nuclear deal: What 'ironclad' guarantees?) slamming Bush for not standing by his initial stand earlier this year-- blanket exemption from current US laws on proliferation. While he sees the bill as sailing through Congress, he suggests that India might (and should) reject it. Why? He points to the bill's prohibition on further Indian nuclear weapons tests, the deal's status as a 'presidential waiver' (meaning a new administration could easily stop it), and the legislation explicit goal to ensure India does not use such cooperation towards nuclear armaments.

The Raghotham position is rather fantastic: suggesting India end its deal to the United States because the US dares to stop India from developing more nuclear weapons. The absence of any such language in the bill would go against America's obligations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which explicitly prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapon technology by any member-state) and would make any approval by skeptical nations within the Nuclear Supplier Group (which runs on a unanimous system) even harder to receive.

But whether or not Raghotham is out of step or not is not the central point. What is truly worrisome in Ragotham's article is the notion that the NPT prohibitions on nuclear weapons proliferation do not and should not apply to India. While one can consider his position merely that of a strong nationalist (how can a country stop another country from pursuing its interests), such a mentality highlights the risk to global non-proliferation posed by the India deal.

If India is rewarded with nuclear supplies and technology by virtue of it respecting or being a part of the NPT, what does that tell current member states who now restrain from proliferation (based on the premise that their abstention means every other nation's abstention)?

Also what happens when the deal gets passed (for it will be passed regardless of language concerns) and one finds India using it to increase its nuclear weapons stock-pile? Normally this would be a controllable problem: India is an NPT-outlier and not subject to its prohibitions. But when the United States (a dispository power of the treaty) is seen helping India violate the intent of the Treaty (curbing the proliferation of weapons), what weight does the Treaty have or America's call to control other aspiring proliferators (North Korea and Iran)?

Now this might not be a problem for Ragotham: he seems to only wish to maximize Indian security interests and is profoundly paranoid of American interests. Yet, what happens when such a deal leads to other countries (Egypt or Saudi Arabia) producing their own weapons or increasing and modernizing their current forces (China and Pakistan)? Such a development does two things: 1) takes away the very prestige India has received from this 'special' nuclear package by diluting the nuclear genie and 2) erodes their security situation. This is not even to mention the risk of nuclear terrorist attacks, fears which have been given new credence by the recent attacks in Mumbai.

Such observations seem to refute Bush administration arguments that the N-deal would bring India into the counter-proliferation fold. While it does crave out a position for them, a exceptional one, it has so far failed to inculcate the norms behind the NPT: chiefly that nuclear weapons are destablizing forces within the international system. If anything the deal has heightened demands within India for a 'free hand' when it comes to its nuclear decisions. While some may be sympathetic to such a position (for the US and others have done the same for decades), what happens when 2, 5 or 10 more nations-- stable or otherwise-- request the same treatment? And to top it off, there is no longer any effective measure to stop them-- short of hard force.

Suddenly the world looks a lot more grim.

The India deal is fundamentally flawed: giving India nuclear supplies without demanding that all its nuclear sites (not just non-military, as defined by them) or a guarantee adopt either the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty or NPT turned a diplomatic deal into a 'gift' to India. And with such a negative response from common-sense and necessary language amendments from Congress, it seems this 'gift' has not come with the promised healthy and understanding partnership between India and the United States.

But while flawed, the deal does not guarantee failure: with the right enactment, NSG amendments and IAEA inspection protocols disaster can be avoided. Furthermore, future administrations (as the legislation coming out of Congress emphasizes US executive flexibility by its 'waiver' component) will have a crack at modifying any problems with the deal latter. But in the meantime, this much is clear: there will be two more months of 'nuclear spin' coming out of the US Congress, the White House, and India.

References

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060720/world.htm#1
http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/jul/19guest1.htm
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1747546,001301790001.htm
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/68794.htm
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/11/mumbai.blasts/index.html
http://www.us-indiafriendshipcouncil.org/








0 Comments:

Post a Comment

<< Home