Mixed News from Libya: Successful HEU Extraction, Failed Nuclear Trial
The Washington Post and the United Press International reported today on the successful extraction of 6.6 pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Libya and the past removal of 37 pounds of HEU in 2004.
The joint venture brought together the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, Russia (where the material originated), and the IAEA.
The recently removed HEU from Tripoli will now be sent to Russia, where it will be blended into low enriched uranium: a much less dangerous substance with US and IAEA supervision.
This latest action shows the transformation of Libya from an isolated, terror-sponsoring nation to 'responsible' nation status. Such a powerful case of counter-proliferation has not been seen since the successful removal of nuclear weapons from former Soviet states after the fall of the Soviet Union.
How the Downblend Process Works
If this current program is following past US-Russian agreements to downblend uranium, the process detailed by Elena Sokova will take place:
Several Russian facilities are involved in the HEU blend-down process, from warhead dismantlement to dilution into LEU. First, Russian nuclear warheads are dismantled at nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly facilities. Following this, HEU components are shipped to the Siberian Chemical Combine (in Seversk) and the Mayak Production Association (in Ozersk), where they are turned into metal shavings and then converted into uranium oxide (U3O8). The U3O8 is then converted into highly enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at either the Siberian Chemical Combine or the Krasnoyarsk Electrochemical Plant (in Zelenogorsk). These two facilities, as well as the Ural Electrochemical Combine (in Novouralsk), dilute the UF6 to produce LEU with a concentration of uranium-235 below 5%. (For more information on this process, refer to the Megatons to Megawatts section of the USEC website.) The LEU is then packaged and shipped via St. Petersburg to the United States. Upon receipt of the LEU, USEC pays TENEX. Once in the United States, USEC may alter the LEU enrichment level according to its customers' specifications, or send the LEU unaltered to a US commercial nuclear-fuel fabricator.[1]
Botched German Libyan Nuclear Trial
But this good news on the proliferation front, comes along with the sorry conclusion of Gotthard Lerch's trial in Mannheim, GER on charges that he had aided Libya's nuclear program (as reported today in The Guardian). Facing charges that he had violated German anti-proliferation regulations, the judge today threw out the case citing the prosecutions refusal to share evidence with the defense.
If found guilty of accepting 8 million euros in return for helping to bring about a nuclear Libya, Lerch would have faced up to 15 years in prison.
IranWatch, a site dedicated to exposing Iran's illicit nuclear and missile proliferation, has the following description of Lerch:
A German businessman, reportedly identified by Libya and Iran as being involved in their acquisition of uranium enrichment technology as a middleman associated with Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation network; formerly in charge of an industrial technology and metallurgy division at Leybold-Heraeus (now part of Unaxis AG), a producer of high-technology equipment allegedly involved in the supply of nuclear equipment to Pakistan and Iraq in the 1980s, where he was reportedly implicated by German authorities along with co-worker Otto Heilingbrunner in the illegal export to Switzerland of blueprints and construction plans for uranium enrichment plant components; alleged to have tried and failed to obtain supplies of pipes for Libya's Project Machine Shop 1001, allegedly planned by Peter Griffin, a British citizen and alleged longtime supplier to Khan, to be a workshop in Libya to make centrifuge components that could not be obtained from outside Libya; reportedly admitted to supplying Pakistan valves, vacuum pumps, brazing furnaces, measuring instruments and a gas-purifying plant in the 1980s, much of which was reportedly shipped to Pakistan by way of Switzerland, France and Dubai; currently resides in Switzerland. [2]
While not blocking the pathway for a retrial, such a development suggests a weak case against this suspected proliferator. This most likely reflects the inherent difficulty of punishing individuals or corporations that aid nations in illicit proliferation.
Sources
"U.S. officials get Libya to return uranium," UPI Security and International. July 27, 2006.
"More nuclear fuel removed from Libya, US says," Reuters. July 26, 2006. Accessed through the Washington Post.
Traynor, Ian. "First trial over Libya'a nuclear bomb plan collapses," Guardian Unlimited. July 27, 2006.
[1] Elena Sokova; "Russia: Overview of the US-Russian HEU-LEU Program." NTI. May 2, 2005.
[2] IranWatch. Taken from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.
The Washington Post and the United Press International reported today on the successful extraction of 6.6 pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Libya and the past removal of 37 pounds of HEU in 2004.
The joint venture brought together the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, Russia (where the material originated), and the IAEA.
The recently removed HEU from Tripoli will now be sent to Russia, where it will be blended into low enriched uranium: a much less dangerous substance with US and IAEA supervision.
This latest action shows the transformation of Libya from an isolated, terror-sponsoring nation to 'responsible' nation status. Such a powerful case of counter-proliferation has not been seen since the successful removal of nuclear weapons from former Soviet states after the fall of the Soviet Union.
How the Downblend Process Works
If this current program is following past US-Russian agreements to downblend uranium, the process detailed by Elena Sokova will take place:
Several Russian facilities are involved in the HEU blend-down process, from warhead dismantlement to dilution into LEU. First, Russian nuclear warheads are dismantled at nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly facilities. Following this, HEU components are shipped to the Siberian Chemical Combine (in Seversk) and the Mayak Production Association (in Ozersk), where they are turned into metal shavings and then converted into uranium oxide (U3O8). The U3O8 is then converted into highly enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at either the Siberian Chemical Combine or the Krasnoyarsk Electrochemical Plant (in Zelenogorsk). These two facilities, as well as the Ural Electrochemical Combine (in Novouralsk), dilute the UF6 to produce LEU with a concentration of uranium-235 below 5%. (For more information on this process, refer to the Megatons to Megawatts section of the USEC website.) The LEU is then packaged and shipped via St. Petersburg to the United States. Upon receipt of the LEU, USEC pays TENEX. Once in the United States, USEC may alter the LEU enrichment level according to its customers' specifications, or send the LEU unaltered to a US commercial nuclear-fuel fabricator.[1]
Botched German Libyan Nuclear Trial
But this good news on the proliferation front, comes along with the sorry conclusion of Gotthard Lerch's trial in Mannheim, GER on charges that he had aided Libya's nuclear program (as reported today in The Guardian). Facing charges that he had violated German anti-proliferation regulations, the judge today threw out the case citing the prosecutions refusal to share evidence with the defense.
If found guilty of accepting 8 million euros in return for helping to bring about a nuclear Libya, Lerch would have faced up to 15 years in prison.
IranWatch, a site dedicated to exposing Iran's illicit nuclear and missile proliferation, has the following description of Lerch:
A German businessman, reportedly identified by Libya and Iran as being involved in their acquisition of uranium enrichment technology as a middleman associated with Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation network; formerly in charge of an industrial technology and metallurgy division at Leybold-Heraeus (now part of Unaxis AG), a producer of high-technology equipment allegedly involved in the supply of nuclear equipment to Pakistan and Iraq in the 1980s, where he was reportedly implicated by German authorities along with co-worker Otto Heilingbrunner in the illegal export to Switzerland of blueprints and construction plans for uranium enrichment plant components; alleged to have tried and failed to obtain supplies of pipes for Libya's Project Machine Shop 1001, allegedly planned by Peter Griffin, a British citizen and alleged longtime supplier to Khan, to be a workshop in Libya to make centrifuge components that could not be obtained from outside Libya; reportedly admitted to supplying Pakistan valves, vacuum pumps, brazing furnaces, measuring instruments and a gas-purifying plant in the 1980s, much of which was reportedly shipped to Pakistan by way of Switzerland, France and Dubai; currently resides in Switzerland. [2]
While not blocking the pathway for a retrial, such a development suggests a weak case against this suspected proliferator. This most likely reflects the inherent difficulty of punishing individuals or corporations that aid nations in illicit proliferation.
Sources
"U.S. officials get Libya to return uranium," UPI Security and International. July 27, 2006.
"More nuclear fuel removed from Libya, US says," Reuters. July 26, 2006. Accessed through the Washington Post.
Traynor, Ian. "First trial over Libya'a nuclear bomb plan collapses," Guardian Unlimited. July 27, 2006.
[1] Elena Sokova; "Russia: Overview of the US-Russian HEU-LEU Program." NTI. May 2, 2005.
[2] IranWatch. Taken from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.
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